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INTRODUCTION: THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The Securities and Exchange Commission's Study of Investment
Companies and Investment Trusts, made pursuant to section 30 of the
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 1 brought into public
* Member of the New York Bar.
The study, H.R. Doc. No. 707, 75th Cong., 2d Sess. (1938), fulfilled the require-
ments of section 30 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 79z-4 (1970)
(originally enacted as ch. 687, tit. I, § 30, 49 Stat. 837 (1935)), which directed the
Securities and Exchange Commission to make a study of investment companies and
investment trusts and to report its recommendations to the Congress by January 4,
1937.
387
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
focus a variety of abuses and unregulated practices present in the in-
vestment company industry in 1938. The study led to lengthy congres-
sional hearings, substantial debate over a detailed regulatory frame-
work and, ultimately, to enactment of a measure imposing controls on
investment company operations, transactions and management—the
Investment Company Act of 1940. 2
 The section 1 preamble declares
the policy and purpose of the Act to be the mitigation and elimination
of certain conditions found by the SEC to affect adversely the national
public interest and the interest of investors, including: (1) the failure
of investment companies to provide investors with adequate, accurate
and explicit information, fairly presented, concerning the character of
their securities and the circumstances, policies, and financial responsi-
bility of their companies and management; (2) the organization, op-
eration and management of investment companies in the interest of
their directors, officers, investment advisers, underwriters or other
affiliated persons rather than in the interest of all the company's share-
holders; and (3) the use, by investment companies, of unsound
methods of keeping accounts, maintaining reserves, and computing
earnings and asset values.8
At the time of the passage of the 1940 Act, Congress recognized
that the subsequent growth of the investment company industry might
require a later re-examination of the industry practices which prompted
its passage and a re-evaluation of the statutory scheme embodied in
the Act. Accordingly, in section 14 (b), Congress directed the SEC to
study the specific effects of such growth on the industry, the securities
markets, and the American industrial economy and to report its find-
ings and recommendations to the Congress' The provision proved to
be prophetic. In the next thirty years, the investment company indus-
try evolved from a $1 billion industry to a $50 billion industry, 8 and
the regulated investment company emerged as one of the major finan-
cial institutions in the United States.
In 1958, the SEC retained the Securities Research Unit of the
Wharton School of Finance and Commerce of the University of Penn-
sylvania to make a thorough investigation of investment company ac-
tivities. The Wharton Study Report, submitted in 1962, focused on the
structure and control of open-end investment companies, commonly
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 et seq. (1970). Concurrently with enactment of the Investment
Company Act of 1940, Congress enacted the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, which
required registration and reporting by investment advisers and provided a statutory
basis for their regulation. 15 H 80b-1 et seq. (1970). The 1970 Amendments
affected the Advisers Act as well as the Investment Company Act. See text at notes
186-203 infra.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 (1970).
4 15 U.S.C.	 80a-14(b) (1970).
5 Investment Company Institute, 1971 Mutual Fund Fact Book 3, 7.
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known as mutual funds.° The SEC itself directed its attention to the
selling and distribution practices of the industry in its 1963 Report of
the Special Study of Securities Markets.? The findings of these studies
led to a third SEC report, issued in 1966, that embodied specific legis-
lative recommendations. This report, Public Policy Implications of In-
vestment Company Growth,8 concluded:
The Investment Company Act of 1940 has substantially elim-
inated the serious abuses at which it was aimed, but the
tremendous growth of the industry and the accompanying
changes have created a need for additional protections for
mutual fund shareholders in areas which were either unantic-
ipated or of secondary importance in 1940.°
The legislative recommendations embodied in these three studies
were incorporated in the SEC's draft of the Investment Company
Amendments Act, which was introduced in identical form in the Senate
and House of Representatives in May, 1967.'° Additional mutual fund
reform bills were subsequently introduced in both houses.' The In-
vestment Company Institute, representing a major segment of the mu-
o Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, A Study of Mutual Funds, H.R. Doc.
No. 2274, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962). The Wharton Study's focus on open-end companies,
or mutual funds, was apparently motivated by the fact that these companies comprise
the major segment of the investment company industry. For the same reason, this article
will concentrate primarily on the impact of the Amendments on the mutual fund
industry.
7 Securities and Exchange Commission, Special Study of Securities Markets, H.R.
Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pts. 1-4 (1963).
8 Securities and Exchange Commission, Public Policy Implications of Investment
Company Growth, H.R. Rep. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) (hereinafter cited
as SEC 1966 Public Policy Report].
9
 Id. at vii (Letter of Transmittal from Chairman, Securities and Exchange
Commission to President, United States Senate, December 2, 1966).
10 S. 1659, H.R. 9510, and H.R. 9511, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). Although no
final action was taken by either house during the first session of the Ninetieth Congress,
extensive hearings were held. The Senate held seven days of hearings beginning on July
31, 1967, hearing 70 witnesses and accumulating 1200 pages of testimony. Hearings on
S. 1659 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
The House held eight days of hearings beginning on October 10, 1967. Hearings on
H.R. 9510 and H.R. 9511 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
11
 Amended versions of the original bills, supra note 10, were introduced in 1968.
H.R. 14742 and S. 3724, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). After modifications, a "clean bill"
passed the Senate and died in the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.
S. 3724, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). In 1969, at the start of the 91st Congress, S. 3724
was reintroduced as S. 34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. Additional related bills were also intro-
duced: S. 296, H.R. 8980, H.R. 12867, H.R. 13754 and H.R. 14737, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1969). For a description of a large number of measures introduced to amend the 1940
Act from the Eighty-Sixth Congress (1959) through the first session of the Ninetieth
Congress (1967), see North, A Brief History of Federal Investment Company Legislation,
44 Notre Dame Lawyer 677, 690-92 (1969).
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tual fund industry, met with the SEC staff in an attempt to reach an
agreement with respect to controversial areas of the legislation, includ-
ing the fairness of management fees and sales charges, contractual
plan charges and the tightening of the watchdog function of the in-
dependent fund director, but an accord was not easily reached. The
provisions with respect to regulation of management fees proved to be
the major stumbling block. A further review of fund operational prob-
lems was made by the SEC in connection with its Institutional Inves-
tor Study." Serious congressional work on the proposed amendments
was delayed while the SEC and industry representatives endeavored
to reach a consensus. The industry emphasized its desire for a self-reg-
ulatory approach through a new industry association. This proposal was
rejected by the SEC" and, shortly thereafter, a final agreement was
reached with respect to the major provisions of the new legislation.
In May, 1969, S. 2224, drafted after lengthy hearings before the
Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, was passed by the Sen-
ate," and an identical bill, H.R. 11995, was introduced in the House
shortly thereafter." The House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce held extensive hearings of its own and reported out a new
bill, H.R. 17333,16
 which was passed by the House in September,
1970.11
 A joint conference committee was formed to settle the differ-
ences between the Senate- and House-passed bills, and on December
14, 1970, the Senate bill, incorporating major House amendments, was
enacted as the Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970 (1970
Amendments).18
Passage of the 1970 Amendments was not heralded as an event
that would radically alter the structure or practices of the investment
company industry, and no comprehensive analysis of their legislative
background and substantive provisions was immediately undertaken
12
 Institutional Investor Study Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
H.R. Doc. No. 92-64, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). Although not completed until 1971,
the study was begun in 1968.
15
 The SEC felt that a self-regulatory association would (1) insulate investment
advisers from stockholder litigation, (2) require an exemption from the antitrust laws,
(3) encourage an industry-wide standard as to permissible fees and expense ratios which
would not be suitable for funds of differing sizes and investment objectives, (4) require
rate-making as an incident to effective SEC oversight, and (5) fragment the role of the
NASD by shifting the regulation of sales loads to the new organization. Hearings on
H.R. 11995, S. 2224, H.R. 13754 and H.R. 14737 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce
and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. 428-53 (1969) [hereinafter cited as 1969 House Hearings].
14 115 Cong. Rec. 13700 (1969).
15 Id. at 15351.
16 H.R. Rep. No. 91-1382, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970
House Report].
11 116 Cong. Rec. 33296 (1970).
18 Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413 (1970).
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in the legal journals. However, as a result of subsequent SEC rules,
interpretative releases, and staff no-action letters implementing the new
sections of the Act, much of the industry has begun to feel the regula-
tory impact of the Amendments. The effect on the day-to-day operations
of investment companies and their investment advisors, underwriters,
broker-dealers and other financial institutions, particularly banks and
insurance companies subject to the provisions of the 1970 Amendments,
is expected to be increasingly significant.
This article will focus upon those provisions of the 1970 Amend-
ments that are expected to have the greatest immediate practical im-
pact upon operations of investment companies, especially mutual funds.
As a prelude to an examination of each section and of any administra-
tive implementation it has undergone since 1970, the legislative back-
ground and language of the provision will be analyzed in greater detail
than has hitherto been available." The timeliness of a consideration of
these factors, two years after enactment of the Amendments, is assured
by the current lack of judicial interpretation and underlined by the
critical role that such factors have played in recent litigation in the se-
curities field 20 For those sections of the Amendments that have been
the subject of SEC rules, releases and no-action letters, such adminis-
trative implementation will be analyzed in detail. Throughout the arti-
cle, the author has endeavored to emphasize the practical importance
of the Amendments and any subsequent administrative implementa-
tion for individual investment companies and for the industry as a
whole.
I. MANAGEMENT CONTRACTS AND REGULATION
OF ADVISER COMPENSATION
A. Structure and Operational Problems
Registered investment companies ordinarily enter into a contract
with an investment adviser for management of the fund's assets. For its
services, the adviser receives a management fee which is usually cal-
culated as a percentage of the fund's total assets.2' In 1940, mutual
19 A previous article by the present author surveyed the provisions of the 1970
Amendments shortly after their passage, but in considerably Less detail. See Manges, In-
vestment Company Amendments Act of 1970, 26 Bus. Lawyer 1113 (1971).
29 See, e.g., Bath Industries, Inc. v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1970), and GAF
Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972), in-
volving the Williams Act Amendments to the Securities Exchange Act. The importance
of the legislative history of the Amendments to the outcome of these cases in both the
federal district courts and circuit courts of appeal is discussed in Comment, 13 B.C.
Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 149, 164-66 (1971) and Comment, 13 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev.
1113, 1151-62 (1972).
21 The fee is usually set at a fixed percentage of the total assets of the fund and
does not vary with the size of these assets. Glick, Mutual Fund Management Fees: In
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fund advisory fees were not an area of principal concern, but the sub-
sequent dramatic increase in total fund assets and the number of mu-
tual fund investors revealed a need for more serious regulation of ad-
visory compensation.22
The organizational structure of mutual funds creates compensa-
tion patterns which differ markedly from those of ordinary business
corporations. While internal management is characteristic of the typical
corporation, mutual funds contract with "independent" advisers for
management and investment services, and this "independent" adviser
has typically played a leading role in establishing the fund and will
continue to dominate the fund's operations and policies through control
of the fund's board of directors. Thus the negotiations between the
fund and the adviser leading to the advisory contract may not always
occur at arm's length.
The 1940 Act dealt only tangentially with the potential problems
created by the relationship between fund and investment adviser.
Rather than dealing directly with the problems involving advisory
compensation, the Act attempted to prevent them merely by requiring
a degree of independence on the part of investment company boards.
First, the Act prohibited most transactions in securities and other prop-
erty between investment companies and their advisers or affiliated per-
sons.' Second, at least forty percent of a fund's directors had to be
((unaffiliated" (as defined by the Act) with the adviser." Third, all
advisory contracts had to be initially approved by a vote of the fund's
shareholders and reapproved annually by a majority of either the un-
affiliated directors or the shareholders."
This regulatory scheme, however, did not prove entirely effective.
For example, fund managers might propose for election a slate of direc-
tors who, although not technically "affiliated persons" as defined in
section 2 (a) (3) of the Act, were their personal friends and could be
counted upon to vote with management, thus raising a question as to
the adequacy of the Act's definition of "affiliated person." In any event,
the only contracts presented to the unaffiliated directors for their ap-
proval might be those upon which the affiliated directors had already
Search of a Standard, 25 Bus. Lawyer 1471, 1473 (1970). Of those advisers charging a
fixed fee, one-half of one percent is the fee most commonly charged. SEC 1966 Public
Policy Report, supra note 8, at 46, 99. See also The Mutual Fund Industry: A Legal
Survey, 44 Notre Dame Lawyer 881 (1969).
22 Fund shareholders periodically challenged advisory fees as constituting excessive
payments to fund management and a waste of fund assets. See, e.g., Brown v. Bullock,
294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961), Tanzer v. Huffines, 314 F. Supp. 189 (D. Del. 1970),
Saxe v. Brady, 40 Del. Ch. 474, 184 A.2d 602 (1962).
23 15 U.S.C. I 80a-17(a) (1) (1964), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80(a)-17(a) (1) (1970).
24 15 U.S.C. 1 80a-10(a) (1964), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80(a)-10(a) (1970). For
the 1940 Act's definition of "affiliated person," see note 46 infra and accompanying text.
23 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15 (1964), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15 (1970).
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agreed and, with no real option presented to them, unaffiliated directors
and fund shareholders would routinely ratify advisory contracts. In
addition, the unaffiliated directors could not be completely effective in
checking abuses, of which they might be unaware, resulting from a
variety of plans for indirectly compensating affiliated brokers or dis-
tributors. The regulatory mechanism, then, was weak, and mutual fund
management fees did not reflect the economies of scale that fund
growth might have been expected to provide. If a fund's assets grew
from $250 million to $500 million, the management fee—based on one-
half percent of total assets—would double, despite the lack of any such
proportional increase in the costs of managing the fund.
The development of mutual fund "complexes," in which a single
adviser creates and advises a number of individual mutual funds,"
presented additional opportunities for increasing advisory compensa-
tion. Economies of scale realized by the advisers of a fund complex
were sometimes not passed on to their funds. Brokerage business gen-
erated by fund transactions was sometimes directed to selected brokers
in payment for minimal services provided to the adviser or for fund
sales which increased the funds' assets and thus the advisory fees. Fre-
quently the firm receiving brokerage business as compensation for gen-
erating fund sales was affiliated with the adviser, whose fee was based
upon a percentage of fund assets which in turn was dependent upon
fund sales. As long as fund sales exceeded redemptions, the advisory
fee was likely to increase regardless of the funds' performance. The
provisions of the original 1940 Act were not sufficiently comprehensive
to deal with such unforeseen developments.
B. The New Fiduciary Standard
The mutual fund-investment adviser relationship was first scru-
tinized in connection with section 36 of the original 1940 Act, under
which an advisory contract could be found invalid where its consum-
mation constituted "gross misconduct or a gross abuse of trust." 27 In
light of this statutory language, some courts interpreted shareholder
ratification of an advisory contract as imposing upon a plaintiff share-
holder the heavy burden of proving waste of corporate assets. 28 These
courts would refrain from interfering with the ratified contract unless
26 SEC 1966 Public Policy Report, supra note 8, at 47-49. For a comprehensive
discussion of mutual fund complexes, see Glazer, A Study of Mutual Fund Complexes,
119 U. Pa. L. Rev. 205 (1970).
27 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (1964), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (1970). See also
Mundheim, Some Thoughts on the Duties and Responsibilities of Unaffiliated Directors
of Mutual Funds, 115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1058 (1967).
28 see, e.g., Saxe v. Brady, 40 Del. Ch. 474, 184 A.2d 602 (1962), and Meiselman
v. Eberstadt, 39 Del. Ch. 563, 170 A.2d 720 (1961).
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it appeared that no reasonable board of directors could have agreed to
the proposed contract. In addition, the SEC may have been reluctant
to exercise its power to attack advisory contracts due to the nature of
the sanction provided by the 1940 Act—an injunction against acting
in an advisory capacity"— which may have appeared particularly
harsh when the sole basis for the Commission's attack was adherence
by the adviser to the traditional fee structure of the industry.
The demonstrated inability of existing law to deal satisfactorily
with these problems prompted the SEC to seek broader statutory con-
trols. The revision of section 36 by the Investment Company Amend-
ments Act of 1970" is the culmination of the SEC's efforts in this area.
In an effort to bring a degree of regulation to management compensa-
tion, the SEC had proposed in 1968 that a "reasonableness" test be
statutorily imposed upon the compensation provisions of advisory
contracts. Segments of the investment company industry strenuously
opposed this test and successfully blocked enactment of such an
amendment by the Ninetieth Congress. The introduction of the concept
in the Ninety-First Congress as part of the 1970 Amendments produced
similarly polarized positions. However, the SEC and industry repre-
sentatives agreed, after lengthy discussions, that the investment adviser
should have an affirmative fiduciary duty to its fund with respect to
compensation received from the fund by the adviser or its affiliates for
services rendered or for payments of a material nature. The "fiduciary
duty" standard was then substituted for the "reasonableness" test by
the Senate Committee. The SEC believed the substitution to be of pro-
cedural rather than substantive significance, since, as a fiduciary, the
adviser, and others who may receive compensation from the adviser's
fee, were already subject to lawsuits which might be instigated by
shareholders or by the SEC in the event that the fee received was con-
sidered to be so unreasonable and excessive as to constitute a breach
of fiduciary duty.0 New section 36 thus replaced the gross-misconduct-
or-abuse-of-trust standard of former section 36 with a federal statutory
fiduciary duty standard.
Under new section 36(a) the SEC, and possibly a shareholder of
a registered fund suing on behalf of the fund, may institute an action
in federal court against individuals who are officers, directors, and ad-
visory board members of an investment company, its investment ad-
viser, or its principal underwriter, if these individuals have engaged
or are about to engage in any act or practice constituting a breach of
29 15 U.S.C. I 80a-43 (1964), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-43 (1970).
20 15 U.S.C. g 80a-35 (1970), amending 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (1964).
21 Memorandum from SEC to Chairman, House Interstate and Foreign Commerce
Committee and Chairman, Senate Banking and Currency Committee, November 13, 1969.
1969 House Hearings, supra note 13, at 187-90.
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fiduciary duty involving personal misconduct." Liability under this
section is not restricted to violations which occur with respect to ad-
visory compensation but encompasses the full range of transactions in
which individuals serving a registered fund in certain designated ca-
pacities may be involved. The requirement that there be evidence of
personal misconduct before the Commission may act is the result of a
congressional intention that this section not serve as a license for gen-
eral revision of industry practices by the Commission."
Section 36(b), added by the Amendments, specifically imposes a
fiduciary obligation upon investment advisers with respect to compen-
sation received by them from an investment company or its share-
holders." An action for breach of fiduciary duty may be brought either
by the SEC or by a shareholder of the investment company acting on
behalf of the company against the investment adviser and any affiliated
person of the investment adviser, as well as any officer, director, ad-
visory board member or depositor, or principal underwriter of the in-
vestment company who has a fiduciary duty concerning the receipt of
such compensation or payments received. 85 A 36(b) action may be
brought only in the federal courts, and damages or other relief granted
only against a recipient of advisory compensation or payments." How-
ever, the fiduciary duty of the adviser with respect to compensation
received is extended to include compensation received by its affiliated
persons so as to prevent an investment adviser from evading liability
by arranging for excess compensation to be paid to it through an affil-
iated person acting as a conduit. Damages are limited to the actual in-
jury resulting from the breach of fiduciary duty and may not exceed
the amount of compensation received by the adviser or its affiliate from
the investment company or its shareholders." No damages may be re-
82 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(a) (1970), amending 15 U.S.C. 80a-35 (1964). The House
Committee report on § 36(a) implies that a private right of shareholder action is also
contemplated. 1970 House Report, supra note 16, at 37-38. See also Brown v. Bullock,
294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961), and Tenzer v. Huffines, 314 F. Supp. 189 (D. Del. 1970).
In addition, the Chief Counsel of the SEC's new Division of Investment Management
Regulation has stated that there is no reason to suppose that any court would seriously
entertain an argument that amended section 36(a) excludes a private right of action
merely because Congress provided a stricter standard of duty and expanded the scope
of relief. Freedman & Rosenblatt, Duties to Mutual Funds, 4 Rev. of Sec. Reg. 937
(1971).
83 The House report on this section indicates that it Is intended to deal with
violations committed by individuals. It stated that in appropriate cases, nonfeasance of
duty or abdication of responsibility would constitute a breach of fiduciary duty Involving
personal misconduct. 1970 House Report, supra note 16, at 37.
84 15 U.S.C.	 80a-35(b) (1970), amending 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (1964).
85 Id,
80 15 U.S.C. * 80a-35(b)(3) (1970), amending 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (1964).
BT Section 36(b) does not impose any limitations, however, on suits or damages
with respect to compensation or payments made to affiliated persons in connection with
transactions subject to § 17 of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (1970).
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covered for any period prior to one year before the institution of the
action."
By amending the restrictive "gross abuse of trust" language," and
thus eliminating the ground on which courts had relied to find a pre-
sumption favoring ratified advisory contracts, new section 36 gives
broad discretion to the courts to grant such relief as is necessary and
appropriate." This new judicial flexibility is not without limitation,
however. While the amendment vests exclusive jurisdiction in the
federal courts under section 36(b) to determine whether an invest-
ment adviser has breached its fiduciary duty in setting or receiving
a fee, the section is not intended to authorize a court to substitute
its business judgment in the area of management fees for that of a
mutual fund's board of directors.' Under section 36(b) (2), the ap-
proval of a management compensation or advisory contract by a fund's
board or by it shareholders is to be given such weight by the court as
is "deemed appropriate under all the circumstances" of the particular
case." In short, a reasonable determination of the management fee
made by a fund's directors, including a majority of the disinterested
directors, would be entitled to substantial weight.
The legislative history of the 1970 Amendments indicates that a
court, in reaching a determination as to whether an adviser has prop-
erly acted as a fiduciary in relation to compensation it received, is to
look at all the facts in connection with the determination and receipt
of such compensation, including: (1) the nature, quality and extent
of the services rendered to the fund; (2) the extent to which economies
of scale and common management were shared with the fund; (3) the
size of the fund and its investment advisory fee in comparison with
that of comparable funds or clients and comparable advisers; (4) the
ratio of fund expenses to net assets; (5) other income received by the
adviser from the fund (i.e., brokerage commissions, payments for re-
search services, subsidiaries' underwriting fees); (6) the extent of fund
recapture of brokerage commissions; (7) the nature and sophistication
of the inquiry, consideration and analysis of the investment advisory
contract by the fund's directors and the nature of the advisory fee
88 is U.S.C. § 80a-35(b)(3) (1970), amending 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (1964).
88 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(a) (1970), amending 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (1964).
4o Language in old section 36 to the effect that the court "shall" issue an injunction
upon certain findings was changed to "may." 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(a) (1970), amending
15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (1964).
41 "This section is not intended to shift the responsibility to manage an investment
company in the best interest of its shareholders from the directors of such company to
the judiciary." S. Rep. No. 91-184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
1969 Senate Report].
42 15 U.S.C. g 80a-35(b)(2) (1970), amending 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (1964).
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negotiations; and (8) the existence and circumstances of any ratifica-
tion or approval by the independent directors or stockholders."
One effect of new section 36(b) on the mutual fund industry, then,
may be an increase in litigation by fund shareholders and the SEC
attempting to establish breaches of fiduciary duty with respect to com-
pensation received by advisers. Judicial application of the new fidu-
ciary standard for advisory compensation may initially require some
lengthy proceedings in order to assemble the economic information
necessary for making a determination as to the reasonableness of ad-
visory fees. Such proceedings could require considerable expenditures
by funds and a substantial commitment of time by fund personnel who
might otherwise be endeavoring to improve the fund's investment per-
formance. In the meantime, the uncertainty created by the 1970
Amendments over the mechanics of establishing management fees and
income levels consistent with a "fiduciary duty" will make manage-
ment planning difficult for funds. Where fund advisers are affiliated
with brokerage firms, some incentive will exist to recapture, consistent
with rules of national stock exchanges, commissions for the funds in
order to ensure that benefits received by the adviser from the broker-
age operation do not provide a basis for attacking the advisory fee
paid by the fund. A successful suit against an adviser for recovery by
a fund of retained brokerage commissions might also significantly af-
fect the solvency of the investment adviser. In order to avoid litigation,
funds may lower management fees as well as eliminate external invest-
ment advisers by internalizing advisory functions and delegating such
functions directly to fund officers.
C. The Rote of the Independent Director and the New
"Interested Person" Standard
In an effort to supplement the new statutory standard of adviser
responsibility, the 1970 Amendments place new responsibilities upon
independent fund directors. Experience under the original 1940 Act
indicated the inability of some independent directors to function as
effective watchdogs over management activities."
Section 10 of the 1940 Act45 provided that at least forty percent
of the directors of a registered fund had to be persons who were not
43 S. 34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(d)(2) (1969); 1969 House Hearings, supra note
13, at 188; 1970 House Report, supra note 16, at 37; 1969 Senate Report, supra note
41, at 15. See also Securities and Exchange Commission, Memorandum to the Chairman
of the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, 1969 House Hearings, supra
note 13, at 188.
" See text at notes 23-26 supra.
45 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10 (1964), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10 (1970).
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officers or employees of the fund, investment advisers of the fund or
affiliated persons of such investment advisers. It also provided that if
any officer, director or employee of the fund acted as, or was affiliated
with, the fund's principal underwriter, the fund's regular broker or
any investment banker, a majority of the fund's board bad to be un-
affiliated with such underwriter, broker or investment banker. Sec-
tion 2 (a) (3) of the 1940 Act defined an "affiliated person" to include:
(1) any person directly or indirectly owning, controlling or
holding voting power over five percent or more of the out-
standing voting shares of another person [i.e., fund];
(2) any person five percent or more of whose outstanding
voting shares were directly or indirectly owned, controlled or
held with voting power by another person;
(3) any person directly or indirectly controlling, controlled
by, or under common control with another person;
(4) any officer, director, partner or employee of another per-
son; and
(5) a fund's investment adviser."
The function of section 10 was to provide an independent check
on management and a vehicle for representation of shareholder in-
terests in investment company affairs. The House and Senate Com-
mittees which handled the 1970 Amendments stated in their reports"
that the definition of an "affiliated person" in Section 2(a) (3) of the
original 1940 Act was insufficient to enable section 10 to accomplish
its intended purpose. Under the section 2 (a) (3) definition, a fund
director might own 4.99 percent of the adviser's stock, have substantial
business, professional or personal ties with the fund or its adviser, and
even be related by blood or marriage to one of the fund's directors or
officers, and still be classified as unaffiliated." To assure more com-
plete independence of directors who are purportedly independent, the
1970 Amendments substituted the term "interested person" for the
term "affiliated person" in section 10 (composition of fund boards),
section 15 (approval of advisory and underwriting contracts), and
section 32(a) (selection of accountants)." The definition of an "in-
terested person," contained in section 2(a) (19)," is far more compre-
hensive than its predecessor. Under this definition, the following
48 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(3) (1970).
47 1970 House Report, supra note 16, at 13; S. Rep. No. 91-184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1969), reprinted in U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4927 (1970).
48 1970 House Report, supra note 16, at 13-14.
49 Significantly, the new "interested person" concept does not expand the scope of
sections 10(f) and 17 of the 1940 Act, which prohibit transactions between investment
companies and their affiliated persons without prior SEC approval. See 1970 House
Report, supra note 16, at 14, and 1969 Senate Report, supra note 41, at 33.
99 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19) (1970).
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persons are considered interested persons of a fund and are disquali-
fied from serving as disinterested directors for purposes of meeting the
forty percent requirement of section 10, as amended:
(1) affiliated persons of the fund, its investment adviser and
principal underwriter;
(2) members of the immediate family of persons so affiliated,
including any parent, spouse of a parent, child, spouse of a
child, spouse, brother or sister, including step and adoptive
relationships;
(3) persons acting as legal counsel for the fund, its adviser
or principal underwriter within the last two fiscal years, and
partners and employees of such counsel;
(4) registered brokers or dealers and their affiliated persons;
(5) persons who knowingly have any direct or indirect legal
or beneficial interest in securities issued by the fund's adviser,
or principal underwriter, or by any corporation controlling
one of these;
(6) persons designated by SEC order as interested persons
by reason of a material business or professional relationship,
existing within the last two fiscal years, with the fund or its
investment adviser or principal underwriter, with another
fund having the same adviser or principal underwriter, or
with the principal executive officer or any controlling person
of one of these.'
A number of interpretative questions have been raised regarding
the application of the "interested person" definition, particularly with
respect to category (6) above." Questions as to what constitutes a
"material business or professional relationship" have been raised by
fund management internally and in formal applications to the SEC
for administrative interpretations. The legislative history of the "in-
terested person" sections indicates that a relationship is to be con-
51 Id. With respect to the prohibitions upon brokers and dealers, the SEC, in a
published no-action letter, Massachusetts Investors Growth Stock Fund, Inc., May 3,
1971, 2 CCH Mutual Funds Guide 11 9237 (1971), ruled that a fund director who was
an officer, director and 25% shareholder of a corporation which owned a broker-dealer
subsidiary registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, was an "interested
person" of an investment company under section 2(a)(19)(A)(v) of the Investment
Company Act, as amended, even though the broker-dealer did not deal with the invest-
ment company. See also SEC no-action letters: Loomis-Sayies Mutual Fund, Inc.,
October 27, 1971, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Cal Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 78,319; Alpha
Investors Fund, Inc., January 9, 1972, [Current] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 78,618 (1972);
S&P Counselors Fund, Inc., January 2, 1972, id. at 1 78,619.
52 SEC no-action letters: CO Fund, Inc., Jan. 7, 1972, 2 CCH Mutual Funds Guide
11 9440 (1972) ; Alpha Investors Fund, Inc., Dec. 10, 1971, id. at 11 9378 (1971); Creative
Capital Corp., Nov. 24, 1971, id. at 11 9424; Loomis-Sayles Mutual Fund, Inc., Oct. 27,
1971, id. at ¶ 9323; GAC Growth Fund, Inc., Oct. 26, 1971, id. at ¶ 9380; and South-
western Investors, Inc., May 14, 1971, id. at ¶ 9232. The portion of the definition
referred to is found at 15 U.S.C. 80a-2(a)(19) (A)(vi), and (B)(vi) (1970).
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sidered material if it "might tend to impair the independence of a
director, but [that it] would not be deemed to impair independence
where the benefits flow from the director of an investment company to
the other party to the relationship" since such relationship is not likely
to make the director beholden to that party."
Determination of "disinterested" status is often a close question.
For example, a director would not be considered to have a material
business relationship with a . fund adviser-broker simply because the
director is a brokerage customer accorded no special treatment." In
one case, exemplifying a particularly difficult interpretation of a "ma-
terial business relationship," a proposed fund director was the presi-
dent of a savings and loan company in which another fund director,
who was also principal executive officer of the investment adviser and
principal underwriter, was a director, and the latter director had the
power to vote on matters affecting in a substantial way the first direc-
tor's status as president. The SEC staff determined that the first
director's independence might be impaired, and indicated that it could
give no assurance that it would not recommend a proceeding under
section 2(a) (19) (B) (vi) to declare the director to be an "interested
person.""
Once issued by the SEC, an administrative order involving a
determination as to an individual's "interested person" status may not
take effect until at least sixty days after entry, may have no retroactive
effect, and may be modified or revoked at a subsequent time should
factual changes occur." In addition, the SEC can exempt any person
otherwise classified as "interested" upon an "appropriate showing that
he, in fact, is in a position to act independently on behalf of the invest-
ment company and its shareholders in dealing with the company's
investment adviser or principal underwriter."" This case-by-case ap-
plication of the "material business or professional relationship" test
was intended to eliminate any danger of inadvertent violations of the
requirements of tke Act: the House and Senate committees indicated
in their reports their belief that the SEC had adequate exemptive
authority under section 6(c) of the Act to administer the new pro-
visions in a flexible manner, particularly where persons involuntarily
53
 1970 House Report, supra note 16, at 14-15; see also 1969 Senate Report, supra
note 41, at 33-34.
54
 1969 Senate Report, supra note 41, at 33.
55
 SEC no-action letter, Southwestern Investors, Inc., May 14, 1971, 2 CCH Mutual
Funds Guide 9232 (1971).
58
 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19) (1970), amending 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a) (1964).
57
 1969 Senate Report, supra note 41, at 34, and 1970 House Report, supra note 16,
at 15. See also SEC no-action letter, Massachusetts Investors Growth Stock Fund, Inc.,
May 3, 1971, 2 CCH Mutual Funds Guide fl 9237 (1971).
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became "interested persons."' Such an exemption would appear to be
appropriate, for example, where a fund director is named as executor
of an estate which holds stock in the investment adviser or is the
beneficiary of a trust which acquires and holds such stock without
his knowledge. The application of the new term "interested person"
is expected, however, to pose continuing problems for fund operations,
and funds will look to counsel and to the SEC for greater certainty
with respect to individual interpretative problems. Compliance is ab-
solutely necessary, since improper composition of a board under sec-
tion 10 and/or improper approval of a transaction under sections 15
or 32(a) could result in a shareholder or SEC suit.
Having thus taken steps to strengthen the independence of "dis-
interested" fund directors from fund management, the 1970 Amend-
ments imposed new obligations on such directors with respect to the
approval of advisory and distribution contracts and selection of the
fund's accountants. First, with respect to the approval of contracts,
section 15(c) of the Act," added by the 1970 Amendments, requires
that the terms of all contracts between the fund and an investment
adviser or principal underwriter must be approved by a majority vote
of the disinterested directors, and the independent "disinterested"
directors are required to cast their votes in person at a meeting called
for the purpose of voting on such approval.' Section 15(c) must be
read in conjunction with section 10: the directors whose votes are
necessary to approve an advisory or underwriting contract must be
members of a board of directors the composition of which complies
with section 10. 6' In addition, section 15 as amended no longer provides
for the alternative approval of a contract by the vote of a majority of
the outstanding voting securities of a fund"2—under new subsection
55 1970 House Report, supra note 16, at 15; S. Rep. No. 91-184, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1970), reprinted in U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4927, 4929 (1970).
59 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (1970), amending 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15 (1964).
99 15 § 80a-15(c) (1970). A memorandum dated Dec. 10, 1969, from the
SEC to Chairman of the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee noted
the finding of the SEC 1966 Public Policy Report that in some investment companies
absentee approval by board members is not uncommon, and the memorandum indicated
that the provisions of the new amendments were meant to "assure informed voting on
matters" which the Committee considered to be a practical necessity if stockholder
interests were to be effectively protected by independent directors. An SEC release
makes it clear that the new requirement that votes be cast in person imposed by the
1970 Act "cannot be complied with by voting over the telephone, through the use of a
closed-circuit television conference, by proxy' or otherwise than by personal appearance."
SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 6336 (Feb. 2, 1971), reprinted in (1970-1971
Transfer Binder] CCH Fed, Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 77,951.
61 Letter from SEC Division of Corporate Regulation to the Investment Company
Institute, August 13, 1971, 2 CCH Mutual Funds Guide ¶ 9244 (1971).
02 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a) (2) (1964), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 0 80a-15(a) (2) (1970).
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(c), every contract must be approved by a majority of the disinterested
directors.
New section 15 also sets forth additional requirements for ap-
proval of advisory contracts. Such requirements are designed to assist
fund directors in the discharge of their fiduciary duty with respect to
approval of an advisory compensation contract. Section 15 (c) now
imposes a duty upon fund directors to solicit and evaluate "such
information as may reasonably be necessary to evaluate the terms" of,
and thus make an informed decision with respect to, a proposed ad-
visory contract.' It is the duty of a fund's adviser to furnish this
information to the directors." Implicit in this duty is the obligation to
review the adviser's operations, expenses and total services to the
fund. Thus, in cases where the facts show that the adviser furnishes
only a minimum of information, it may be unable to justify asking
any substantial fee in the contract renewal negotiations.
With respect to the annual selection of an accountant for a fund,
new section 32(a) of the Act65 makes it unlawful for a registered
fund to file any financial statements with the SEC signed or certified
by an independent public accountant unless such accountant was
selected by a majority vote of the disinterested directors, cast in per-
son and ratified by the fund shareholders at their next annual meeting.
Any vacancy that occurs between annual meetings due to the death or
resignation of the accountant may be filled by a majority vote of the
disinterested directors cast in person at a meeting called for such
purpose, with no ratification required. Retention of the accountant is
subject to the right of the fund, by a majority of voting securities, to
terminate such employment without penalty. 6° Consistent with the
policy of the 1970 Amendments to increase independent review of
major fund transactions, the expansion of the power of independent
directors over selection of fund accountants is expected to encourage
a continuing review of fund financial reporting requirements and more
careful evaluation of the services provided by the accounting firm
retained.
D. Incentive Fees
The performance fee reflects an arrangement whereby the com-
pensation received by the investment adviser is tied to the change in
66 15 U.S.C. 80a-15(c) (1970), amending 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15 (1964). In this con-
nection, see Eisenberg & Lehr, Directorial Responsibility under the Investment Company
Act of 1940, 20 Rutgers L. Rev. 181 (1966), and Miller & Carlson, Recapture of Broker-
age Commissions by Mutual Funds, 46 N.Y.U.L.'Rev. 35 (1970).
84 15 U.S.G.	 80a-15(c) (1970).
65 15 U.S.C.'11 80a-31(a), amending 15 U.S.C. § 80a-31(a) (1964).
66 Id.
402
INVESTMENT ,COMPANY ACT OF 1970
the net asset value of the fund. The most common performance fee
is based upon a comparison between the fund's investment performance
and the record of an index of securities prices. Such an arrangement
provides an incentive for the adviser to concentrate on portfolio
management, especially net asset value, rather than depend upon fund
sales to increase the advisory fee. Congress expressly dealt with incen-
tive compensation in the 1970 Amendments by amending section 205 of
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 [Advisers Act]."
Before 1970, section 205 of the Advisers Act contained a general
prohibition against compensation of investment advisers based upon
a share of realized or unrealized capital appreciation in the advised
accounts." However, the section contained an exemption from this
prohibition for advisory contracts made with a registered investment
company." Many of the performance fee arrangements which devel-
oped under this exemption were heavily weighted in favor of the
adviser, often providing for substantial increases over the basic ad-
visory fee when net asset value appreciated, but little if any decrease
in the basic fee when value declined. When decreases in the fee were
provided for, they were frequently not proportionate to comparable
increases for good investment performance. Such arrangements pro-
vided ample upside potential and little downside risk for the adviser.
The 1970 Amendments narrowed the scope of the section 205 per-
formance fee exemption in order to limit arrangements that might be
unfair to the investment company. 7° Contracts with registered invest-
ment companies and certain other persons now qualify for exemption
only if they meet four requirements:"
(1) the contract must relate to the investment of assets in
excess of $1 million;
(2) the advised person must not be a trust, a collective trust
or a separate insurance account as these terms are defined in
the Investment Company Act; 72
(3) the compensation arrangement must be based on the
asset value of the managed fund averaged over a specified
period of time;
(4) the incentive portion of the fee must increase or decrease
07 15 U.S.C.	 80b-5 (1970), amending 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5 (1964). See also Fink,
Performance Fees, 5 Rev. of Sec. Reg. 829 (1972).
68 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5 (1964), as amended, 15 U.S. C. 11 80b-5 (1970).
00 15 U.S.C.	 80b-5 (1964), as amended, 15 U.S .C. 	 80b-5(B)(1) (1970).
10 15 U.S.C. § 80b-S (1970), amending 15 U.S.0 § 80b-5 (1964). See also SEC
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 316 (April 6, 1972), reprinted in [1971-1972
Transfer Binder] CCH Fed, Sec. L. Rep. 11 78,693, at 8 1,460.
71 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5 (1970).
72 The terms referred to are defined at 15 U.S.C. 	 80a-3(c)(11) and -2(a) (37)
(1970).
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in proportion to the investment performance of the fund over
a specified period. Performance must be measured in relation
to the investment record of an appropriate index of securi-
ties prices. (The point from which increases or decreases in
compensation must be measured is the fee payable when the
investment performance of the fund equals the performance
of the index—called the "fulcrum fee."")
In August 1972, after surveying existing incentive arrangements,"
the SEC adopted rule 205-1 under amended section 205 of the Advisers
Act." Rule 205-1, defining the terms "investment performance" of a
fund and "investment record" of an appropriate index of securities
prices, is designed to clarify the section 205 requirements for measur-
ing investment performance for those investment companies that in-
clude performance fee arrangements in their advisory contracts."
The rule requires that the "investment performance" of a fund and
the "investment record" of the selected index to which fund per-
formance is to be compared must be similarly computed. In addition,
all increments (e.g., all cash contributions) must be considered in mea-
suring the performance of the fund and the index." Specifically, a
fund's investment performance is to be calculated as the percentage
change in net asset value per share over the period specified—adjusted
to reflect an 'assumed reinvestment of any realized capital gains dis-
tributed by the fund, capital gains taxes per share paid or payable on
undistributed realized capital gains, and any dividends paid by the
fund out of its investment income—expressed as a percentage of net
asset value per share at the beginning of the period." This measure
gives effect to all increments in value received by the investment
company's shareholders during the specified period. Similarly, the
investment record of the relevant index for any period is to be calcu-
lated as the percentage change in the level of the index over the speci-
fied period—adjusted to reflect an assumed reinvestment of all cash
vs Rule 205-2(a)(1), 37 Fed. Reg. 24896 (1972); SEC Investment Company Act
Release No. 7484 (Nov. 10, 1972), reprinted in [Current] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
If 79,080, at 82,338 (1972).
74 SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 7113 (April 6, 1972), reprinted in
[1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 78,694, at 81,463. Of 999 invest-
ment companies surveyed by the SEC, 103 had performance fee arrangements on Jan. 3,
1972. Many of these arrangements were found by the SEC to contain features not in
conformity with the provisions of § 205 of the Investment Advisers Act, as amended. Id.
75 Rule 205-1, 37 Fed. Reg. 17648 (1972); SEC Investment Advisers Act Release
No. 327 (Aug. 8, 1972), reprinted in [Current] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. If 78,934 (1972).
76 The SEC made it clear that it was not its intention to prescribe an industry
standard for computing rates of return. SEC Investment Advisers Act Release No. 327
(Aug. 8, 1972), supra note 75, at 82,021 n.1.
77 Id. at 82,020.
78 Rule 205-1(a). Id. at 82,021.
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distributions of the companies whose stocks comprise the index—ex-
pressed as a percentage of the index's level at the beginning of the
period."
Under rule 205-2," adopted in November 1972, in determining
the incentive compensation to be paid, the specified period over which
a fund's asset value is averaged in determining the base fee must be
identical with the period used to compute the investment performance
of the fund and the investment record of the selected index. An exemp-
tion permitting the use of different reference periods is included, how-
ever, for compensation arrangements utilizing a moving average or
"rolling period"" to compute the advisory fee. A rolling period con-
tains a specified number of subperiods of definite length (e.g. months,
quarters), the oldest of which is periodically dropped as the most re-
cent subperiod is substituted.
Rule 205-1 becomes effective with respect to any particular fund
sixty days after its next regular annual shareholders' meeting follow-
ing September 30, 1972, but in no event later than September 1, 1973. 82
Rule 205-2 becomes effective on December 1, 1973 or 60 days after the
next regular shareholder meeting following December 1, 1972, which-
ever is sooner.88 Unless administrative relief is granted, some funds
whose shareholders have voted to amend investment advisory agree-
ments to meet the requirements of rule 205-1 will have to alter the
agreement further to comply with rule 205-2 and submit the agreement
to a second shareholder vote.
To aid persons having a fiduciary duty to investment companies
in matters involving advisory compensation, the SEC announced guide-
lines detailing certain factors which must be considered in arranging
incentive fees in accord with the 1970 Amendments." These guidelines
indicate that the fairness of any incentive fee arrangement is primarily
dependent upon the fairness of the base or fulcrum fee from which
79 Rule 205-1(b). Id.
80 37 Fed. Reg. 24895 (1972), SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 7484
(Nov. 10, 1972), reprinted in [Current] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 79,080 (1972).
81 Rule 205-2(c). SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 7484 (Nov. 10, 1972),
supra note 80, at 82,339.
82 SEC Investment Advisers Act Release No. 327 (Aug. 8, 1972), supra note 75,
at 82,021.
93 SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 7484 (Nov. 10, 1972), supra note 80,
at 82,339.
84 SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 7113 (April 6, 1972), reprinted in
[1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 78,694, at 81,463. See also SEC
Investment Company Act Release No. 6336 (Feb. 2, 1971), reprinted in 11970-1971
Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 77,951, with respect to approval of advisory
contracts under the 1970 Act, and SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 6480 (May
10, 1971), reprinted in 3 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 49,809 (1971), regarding the views
of the SEC's Division of Corporate Regulation (now the Division of Investment
Management Regulation) on the fiduciary duties of investment company directors.
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performance increments will be measured. In considering the fairness
of such a fulcrum fee, fund directors must consider the same factors
as those that are relevant in establishing a proper advisory fee where
no incentive compensation is involved." Another critical factor is the
selection of an appropriate index of securities prices to which the fund's
investment performance may be compared. In determining whether a
proposed index is appropriate for a particular fund, directors should
consider the volatility, diversification of holdings, types of securities
owned and objectives of the fund." The character of the index should
match insofar as is possible the character of the fund's assets.
Although section 205 of the Advisers Act does not require that the
period over which performance is measured be of any particular
length, the SEC has found a fiduciary obligation to use a period suffi-
ciently long to provide a reasonable basis for indicating the adviser's
performance, and to minimize the possibility that payments will be
based upon random or short-term fluctuations." If, for example, assets
were averaged and investment performance were computed over too
short a period, the amount of compensation supposedly paid for per-
formance could be significantly related to accumulated sales. A period
of at least one year is considered by the Commission to be sufficient
to guard against this problem. The fiduciary obligation apparently
imposes both a duty on the adviser not to seek a shorter period and
upon fund directors not to approve one.
In order to provide further protection against imposition of sig-
nificant fee increases based upon random or insignificant differences
between a fund's investment performance and the performance of the
selected index, the SEC has cautioned fund directors to structure in-
centive fee scales with great care. Specifically, the Commission ad-
vocates the use of: (1) "null zones" or intervals around the fulcrum
point in which no performance fee adjustments are made; 88 (2) "con-
tinuous fees" in which incentive payments are scaled down for slight
performance differences, with fractional differences being prorated;"
(3) measurement of performance differences between a fund and the
selected index in terms of percentage points rather than percents (use
of percent differences, possibly misleading in the SEC's view, may
result in a maximum fee adjustment for small absolute differences in
performance) ; 90
 and (4) a specified minimum performance difference,
85 SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 7113 (April 6, 1972), supra note 84,
at 81,464.
so Id. For example, directors should consider whether the fund holds a broad range
of securities, "blue chips," speculative securities or specialized securities. Id.
87 Id. at 81,464-65.
ss Id. at 81,467.
89 Id.
Do For example, where an index increases by 1%, a fund whose net asset value
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measured in percentage points, which must exist before the maximum
fee adjustment can result. While the Commission declined to recom-
mend the use of any particular numerical difference, it did indicate
that as a "rule of thumb" a difference of ten percentage points pro-
vides a ninety percent probability that the maximum fee adjustment
will not result from random or insignificant differences between the
performance of the investment company and the index."
Measurement of adviser performance based on a rolling period,
although not required by section 205, is recommended by the Commis-
sion as having advantages for both fund shareholders and investment
advisers." If a flat period is used, no compensation can be computed
or paid until the period has ended and the investment performance
for the period is known. Interim payments based on interim perfor-
mance are not permitted." Where a rolling period is used, however,
rule 205-2 (c) (1) permits the total fee to be computed and paid at
the end of each subperiod." In addition, the performance portion of the
advisory fee must be computed based on the average assets over the en-
tire rolling period in which the performance was achieved, while the
fulcrum fee must be computed based upon the average assets over the
most recent subperiod of the rolling period." The effect of this portion
of the rule is to permit the fulcrum fee to relate closely to current fund
assets, while ensuring that any incentive or performance fee relates
directly to the assets in which the performance was achieved. Thus,
compensation paid for investment performance is substantially sepa-
rated from the amount of fund sales or redemptions.
The Commission has also stated its policy with respect to the
computation of fees during transitional periods surrounding the initia-
tion or termination of incentive fee arrangements." In order to ensure
that performance compensation be based only upon results obtained
after the effective date of an incentive contract, such contracts may
be instituted on a prospective basis only." This is meant to ensure that
the adviser does not, during the "start-up" period, receive compensa-
tion for successful past performance. Where an incentive contract has
increased by 3% would outperform the index by 200%, although the absolute difference is
only two percentage points. Id. at n.14.
91 Id. at 81,468.
92 Id. at 81,465.
03
 Id. An exception is made where an advisory contract provides for payment of a
minimum fee regardless of performance in which case interim payments based on this
minimum fee may be made. Id. at n.9.
04 Rule 205-2(c)(1), SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 7484 (Nov. 10,
1972), reprinted in (Current] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. II 79,080, at 82,339 (1972).
a n Id.
00 SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 7113 (April 6, 1972), supra note 84,
at 81,465.
07 Id. at 81,466.
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been renegotiated during the contract term and the substituted con-
tract provides for a flat percentage fee, fairness to the fund requires
that the new contract provide that the fee payable for the remainder
of the period of the original incentive contract be the lesser of the
amount that would have been paid under the original contract or the
fee payable under the new contract." Such a "winding down" period
serves, in the case of a rolling performance fee contract, to ensure
substantial advance notice to the fund (not less than half of the fee
computation period specified in the contract) of the adviser's intent
to cancel the contract. Thus it prevents an adviser whose investment
performance during the first part of a contract period has been sig-
nificantly worse than the relevant index from artificially increasing,
during such "winding down" period, his total fee for the contract period
by changing the incentive fee or by switching from an incentive to a
non-incentive fee basis.
Under section 205 of the Advisers Act, the SEC may rule on the
appropriateness of an index for judging the performance of a specific
fund's portfolio. The SEC may also broadly apply the antifraud provi-
sions of section 205 to attack incentive fees which are disproportionate
or which permit compensation in excess of that viewed as appropriate
by the SEC staff. As a result, investment companies may expect per-
formance fees disclosed in registrations filed under the Securities Act
of 1933 and the Investment Company Act of 1940, and in proxy state-
ments, to be carefully reviewed by the SEC. The difficulty of applying
rule 205-2, as presently interpreted by the SEC," may well deter ad-
visers and their funds from using performance fees. Also, the problems
involved in shareholder voting on amendments to complex advisory
contracts and the possibility of new SEC performance fee require-
ments based on the Commission's 1971 Institutional Investor Study
proposal for incentive fees relating to volatility-adjusted investment
returns,100 may deter use of such types of advisory fees. It is possible
that either the SEC or the courts may establish a ceiling, creating a
rebuttable presumption that only performance fees at or below the
ceiling are reasonable and appropriate.
Although the impact of the rules and guidelines under section 205
of the Advisers Act will not be fully felt by the industry until the rules
become finally effective in December 1973, 101 questions concerning the
difficulty of operations within the new rules as well as the usefulness
98 Id.
99 SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 7113 (April 6, 1972), supra note 84.
100 Letter of Transmittal, SEC Institutional Investor Study Report, H.R. Doc.
No. 92-64, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 8, at xiv (1971).
101 See text at notes 82-83 supra.
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of any limitations on compensation for performance are already being
raised.
E. Insider Trading
An additional problem area, insider trading, although distinct from
the management contract, is related indirectly to the area of adviser
compensation. Because of the tremendous financial assets of the mutual
fund industry as a whole102 and of numerous individual funds in par-
ticular,'" when a decision is made by a fund manager to take a posi-
tion in a given security, the market laws of supply and demand dictate
that such a decision is likely to affect the market price of that security.
The extent of the effect depends upon such factors as the size of the
position sought, the speed with which the desired securities are ac-
cumulated, and the normal trading volume in the security. A decision
by a fund to liquidate its holdings in a particular security will similarly
influence the price of that security. Often such decisions are made by
fund managers who control the portfolio of a number of different funds
and intend to take similar action with respect to some or all of them. 104
Obviously, one privy to such significant decisions could, prior to
their execution, utilize his advance knowledge to benefit his personal
portfolio. Since such a person may not technically be a corporate
insider with respect to the issuer of any securities in which the fund
deals, his action may not be affected by the restrictions imposed by
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 105 and rule 10b-5
as presently interpreted."' However, from a regulatory point of view,
such "profiteering" takes unfair advantage of the public investor and
102 As of December 1971, the mutual fund industry had total net assets of approxi-
mately $55 billion. Investment Company Institute, 1972 Mutual Fund Fact Book 3, 7.
At that date these assets represented 7.42% of the total market value of all shares listed
on the New York Stock Exchange. Id. at 12. '
108 As of December 1971 108 funds had assets in excess of $100 million each and
13 funds bad assets of more than $1 billion each. Id. at 9.
104 As of December 1970, the ten leading management companies had assets under
management amounting to $26.1 billion, or close to 55% of total industry assets. Estimate
based on management information for all major management firms as contained in
Moody's Investors Services, 1971 Bank and Finance Manual.
lob 15 U.S.C. 1} 78j(b) (1970).
100 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1972). Although under rule 10b-5 the duty of disclosure
has been imposed on persons other than corporate insiders, such imposition has required
the existence of a special relationship which made such a person privy to the internal
affairs of the corporation. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961), The imposition
of liability on a "tippee" has required a finding that the information received originated
with an inside corporate source in violation of his fiduciary duty to the corporation
concerned. Investors Management Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release. No. 9267
(July 29, 1971), reprinted in [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed, Sec. L. Rep.
¶ 78,163, at 80,523-24 (concurring opinion of Commissioner Smith).
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hence is undesirable. SEC studies in 1963 and 1966 noted that trading
by officers, directors and employees of investment companies and their
investment advisers in the portfolio securities of their funds often
placed such persons in a conflict-of-interest position. The SEC studies
therefore called for the development of adequate restraints.'" The
SEC 1966 Public Policy Report recommended that each registered
investment company be required to adopt a written policy covering
insider trading, and make provisions for its implementation, including
reporting of violations, satisfactory to the Commission. The report
proposed that the minimum acceptable standards for such a policy
should provide for: (1) coverage of all officers, directors, substantial
shareholders and advisory employees of the investment company, its
investment adviser and principal underwriter, but with appropriate
recognition of the problems of independent, unaffiliated directors;
(2) prohibition of purchases or sales of securities, directly or indirectly,
by any person covered by the policy within thirty days prior to or
following the date of a portfolio transaction in the same security
issue, subject to reasonable exceptions, as in the case of hardship or
with respect to such types of securities as the Commission might
exempt from the application of such policy; (3) a requirement that
persons covered by the policy report to the investment company any
personal transactions in issues in its portfolio, such reports not to be
made public but to be available for inspection by the Commission;
and (4) appropriate provision for sanctions in the event of violations
of the policy.1"
The response of the 1970 Amendments to this problem and these
recommendations is contained in new section 17(j) of the Act,"°
which prohibits an affiliated person of a fund, its investment adviser
or principal underwriter and their affiliates from engaging directly or
indirectly in any transaction involving a security held or to be acquired
by the fund, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may adopt for the purpose of preventing fraudulent, de-
ceptive or manipulative practices. The section further provides that
such rules may include requirements for the adoption of codes of
107 Securities and Exchange Commission, Public Policy Implications of Investment
Company Growth, H.R. Rep. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 195-200 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as SEC 1966 Public Policy Report]. Securities and Exchange Commission, Special
Study of Securities Markets, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 241 (1963)
[hereinafter cited as SEC 1963 Special Study] indicated that as many as 14.4%
of all persons affiliated with funds and investment advisers included in the SEC Study
had traded in portfolio securities of the fund with which they were associated during
the same period as the fund, and 8% had traded within 15 days prior to the fund's
trades. Trading following fund transactions was reported by 20.7% of affiliated persons.
108 SEC 1966 Public Policy Report, supra note 107, at 196-200, citing SEC 1963
Special Study, supra note 107, pt. 4, at 225.
10 15 U.S.C. if 80a-17(j) (1970), amending 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17 (1964).
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ethics by registered investment companies embodying such standards
as the SEC finds expedient for carrying out the purpose of the section.'"
In December 1972, the SEC issued a release setting forth a
detailed proposed rule 17j-1, regulating trading by fund "insiders,"
and requiring adoption of a code of ethics by each fund, investment
adviser and principal underwriter."' Proposed rule 17j-1 contains an
anti-fraud proscription against direct or indirect trading in portfolio
securities by "access persons" officers, directors, and advisory em-
ployees of funds, investment advisers, and principal underwriters and
their affiliates. The proposed rule would prohibit any "access person"
from purchasing or selling, directly or indirectly, any security in which
such person has, or by reason of such transaction acquires, any direct
or indirect beneficial interest or ownership and which such person
knows: ( 1 ) is currently being purchased or sold by a registered fund;
(2) is being considered for purchase or sale by the fund; or (3) is
being recommended or is about to be recommended by any advisory
employee of the fund or investment adviser for purchase or sale by
the fund. In its release, the SEC indicated that transactions by fund
"insiders" in the portfolio securities of a fund often placed such per-
sons in a position of conflict of interest, and, further, that the policies
adopted by the industry to deal with this problem revealed considerable
disagreement as to the nature and extent of the obligations of "insiders"
in this area.
The proposed rule is in some ways similar to a proposed voluntary
code submitted to the SEC in November of 1971 by the Investment
Company Institute, acting on behalf of a major part of the mutual fund
industry.112 However, the proposed SEC rule goes beyond the Invest-
ment Company Institute's proposal insofar as it incorporates a require-
ment that "access persons" file with the SEC reports on their personal
securities transactions within ten days of the end of each quarter,
such reports to be patterned after the reporting requirements of rule
204-2 (a) (12) promulgated under the Investment Advisers Act.'" Pro-
posed rule 17j-1 would require funds to adopt codes of ethics which
may provide for an optional "prior written clearance" procedure
under which advance clearance could be obtained for particular trans-
actions if the security in question is not being considered by the invest-
ment company or investment adviser for purchase or sale. The pro-
110 Id.
111 SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 7581 (Dec. 26, 1972), reprinted
in [Current] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. Ii 79,157 (1972).
112 Letter from President of Investment Company Institute to Chairman, Securities
and Exchange Commission, dated November 16, 1971, with draft rules and model code
of ethics attached, reprinted in 2 CCH Mutual Funds Guide n 9316 (1971).
110 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-2(a)(12) (1971).
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posed rule would also provide for appeals from refusals to grant
clearance.
Comments on the proposed rule were to be furnished to the SEC
by March 14, 1973, and it is likely that the rule will be adopted in
the proposed form. It is submitted that the new rule, although needed
to tighten and clarify restrictions on insider trading practices, may
prove difficult to administer on a practical day-to-day level. For ex-
ample, fund "access persons," particularly "disinterested directors"
as defined by the Act, may be trading in securities which they are not
aware "are being considered" for purchase or sale by the fund adviser.
Also, clearance obtained from a co-director or fund officer (elected by
the board) may not be sufficiently difficult to obtain. It appears that
SEC monitoring of insider transactions will be required to insure that
the codes of ethics adopted by the funds are complied with on a day-
to-day basis. It appears certain that fund legal compliance officers will
be busy reviewing existing and potential problems under section 17(j)
of the Act and counseling "access persons" on the relationship of their
personal securities transactions and present and proposed portfolio
transactions of the fund.
II. DISTRIBUTION PROBLEMS
A. Retroactive Registration of Shares
A mutual fund, like all issuers engaged in public offerings, must
register its securities under the provisions of section 5 of the Securities
Act of 1933." 4 Most issuers, however, attempt to offer their securities
publicly within a limited time period. Mutual funds are engaged in a
continuous offering of their shares through a continuous underwriting
process, and stand ready to issue as many shares as are necessary to
meet the public demand. In the course of its business, a fund may in-
advertently offer and sell more shares than are covered by an effective
1933 Act registration statement, and may also fail to file a post-effec-
tive amendment to its original registration to ensure that all shares
offered are registered. Although these excess sales are not likely to
cause harm to an investor as long as each potential purchaser receives
a current prospectus, such sales would violate the section 5 registra-
tion requirement"' as well as various state securities acts."' Thus,
any investor who can show that his shares were not actually registered
114 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970). For a general discussion of the retroactive registration
of mutual fund shares, see SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 6660 (Aug. 6,
1971), reprinted in 01970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. Ir 78,185.
115 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970).
110 See, e.g., N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law { 359-e (McKinney 1968), Cal. Corp. Code § 25110
(West 1968), Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 70, { 43 (Purdon 1965), Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 121i, § 137.5
(Smith-Hurd 1953), and Tex. Ann. Stat. § 851-7 (Vernon 1964).
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at the time of the sale might be entitled to rescind his purchase under
section 12 of the 1933 Act!"
To enable funds to remedy systematically and legally any failure
to register a sufficient number of shares, new section 24(f) of the
Investment Company Aetna provides for the retroactive registration
of shares. Under this section, a delinquent fund may elect to have the
registration of such shares deemed effective as of the time of their
sale, if the fund acts within six months after the sale of the unregistered
securities and pays a fee of three times the otherwise applicable regis-
tration fee!" To protect the interests of investors and the public, the
SEC is given the authority to adopt rules and regulations regarding
this procedure for retroactive registration. Rule 24f-1 requires (1) that
the issuing fund file a statement confirming that the shares for which
retroactive registration is sought were sold in accordance with the
issuer's usual method of distributing its registered shares, including
delivery of prospectuses as required by section 5(b) of the 1933 Act,
and (2) that at the time of the sale of the securities, there was a
registration statement in effect for shares of the same class or series!'
The passage of the section 24(f) amendment was not attended
by any apparent controversy. Its sole purpose was to eliminate the
potential liability of funds to shareholders whose injuries, if any, were
connected to a technical and frequently inadvertent violation of the
securities laws.
B. Sales , Loads
Historically, one of the most serious problems in the mutual fund
industry has been the excessive sales loads imposed on the purchasers
of redeemable fund shares. The "sales load" represents the difference
between the current net asset value per share received by the fund and
the public offering price paid by the investor 121 Through the sales load,
117 15 U.S.C. 4 771 (1970).
118 15 U.S.C. * 80a-24(f) (1970), amending 15 U.S.C. It 80a-24 (1964).
118 15 U.S.C.
	
80a-24(f) (1970).
120 17 C.F.R. § 240.24f-1 (1971).
121 Under § 22(d) of ,the Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(d) (1970),
the current offering price for a fund's shares must be stated in the fund's prospectus.
Thus, if the fund intends to impose a sales charge on purchasers, it must describe the
sales load in the prospectus as a percent of the offering price or of the amount invested.
See SEC no-action letter, Investment Company of America (Sept. 28, 1972), 2 CCH
Mutual Funds Guide If 9557 (1972). The sales charge expressed as a percent of the net
amount invested is always higher than the sales load expressed as a percent of the
public offering price, and the SEC has advised funds to use the former mode of expres-
sion. SEC Guidelines for Preparation of Form S-5, SEC Investment Company Act Release
No. 7219 (June 9, 1972), reprinted in 2 CCII Mutual Funds Guide 11 9476 (1972). See
also Comment, The Mutual Fund Industry: A Legal Survey, 44 Notre Dame Lawyer 732,
836 n.648 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Mutual Fund Survey].
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the purchaser is forced to assume a major part of the costs and ex-
penses of distributing mutual fund shares to the public."'
The distribution process typically begins with an underwriter-
distributor who may also be either the fund's adviser or a subsidiary
of the advisory company. The mutual fund underwriter performs the
usual underwriting function—purchasing the issuer's shares for resale,
at wholesale prices, to independent broker-dealers who sell the shares
at retail to the public. Unlike underwriters of other securities, how-
ever, fund underwriters are not fully subject to the usual risk of resale.
According to the NASD Rules of Fair Practice, section 26(f) (2), the
fund underwriters may not underwrite any shares unless a purchase
order for such shares has already been received by a broker-dealer
from a public customer.'" When a purchase order has been received,
the underwriter sells the shares at net asset value to the broker-dealer
according to the terms of their sales agreement. The broker-dealer
in turn sells the shares to his public customer at a public offering price
consisting of the net asset value plus the sales load. Although the sales
load may vary among funds, the prevailing rate at the time of the
1970 Amendments was 8.5 percent of the total offering price including
the load, or, expressed differently, 9.3 percent of the amount actually
invested.'" The underwriter typically received 2 percent of the in-
vestor's payment, while the remaining 6.5 percent was split between
the broker-dealer and the individual salesman.'"
Except for contractual plans and face-amount certificates,'" the
original 1940 Act imposed no express statutory restriction on sales
loads. In fact, sales loads were not considered a matter of primary
concern during the hearings which led up to the initial passage of the
Act."' It was believed at the time that sales loads were a "technical
item which could be left to competition."'" Unfortunately, the Act
itself foreclosed one important avenue of competition: section 22(d)
of the Act, establishing retail price maintenance, required that all
122
 Mutual Fund' Survey, supra note 121, at 752, 833. According to the SEC 1966
Public Policy Report, supra note 107, at 215, "(Me sates load . . . is purely a payment
for selling effort." Shares of some mutual funds may be purchased at a public offering
price equal to the net asset value per share. There is no sales load because these funds
maintain no dealer organization or staff of sales representatives. Investors are not person-
ally solicited but must apply directly to the underwriter.
128
 National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., Rules of Fair Practice, Art. III,
§ 26(f) (2), reprinted in CCH NASD Rules ll 2176 (1971).
124
 Mutual Fund Survey, supra note 121, at 816. See also Romanski, The Role of
Advertising in the Mutual Funds Industry, 13 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 959, 966 n.41
(1972). .
125 Mutual Fund Survey, supra note 121, at 816.
128
 15 U.S.C.
	 80a-27 ( 1 9 70).
127 Mutual Fund Survey, supra note 121, at 849.
128 Id.
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sales to the public be made at the offering price stated in the fund's
prospectus.'" Dealers were thereby prohibited from engaging in any
form of price competition among themselves. All dealers were required
to sell shares in a given fund at the same price and could not alter the
sales charge fixed by the fund underwriter.'" As an antidote to what
appeared to be an antitrust exemption, section 22 (b) provided that an
"association registered under the Maloney Act [i.e., the NASD] could
prescribe rules in order that the price at which such security is offered
or sold to the public shall not include an 'unconscionable or grossly
excessive sales load! " 18'
In the 1960's, the SEC became increasingly concerned over the
lack of effective competition in the distribution of mutual fund shares
and over the resulting high level of sales loads imposed on investors.
The industry responded to the SEC's concern by maintaining that the
prevailing sales loads were necessary to the continued existence of the
funds and to the retention of effective sales forces.'" Comparing the
cost of investment in securities listed on the various stock exchanges
with the cost of investment in the same securities through a mutual
fund, the industry maintained that funds' sales loads merely rep-
resented a realistic price for all of the rights and benefits acquired by
the mutual fund shareholder.'" The purchaser acquires the right to
future dividends and capital gains distributions, and in addition obtains
the increased security of a diversified investment portfolio and pro-
fessional investment management.
In its attempt to change the non-competitive sales load structure
of the fund distribution system, the SEC had two possible courses of
action open to it. First, competition could be restored by a repeal of
section 22(d). Shares could then be sold at any price above net asset
value, enabling retail dealers to attract customers by offering lower
prices.1" The SEC feared, however, that funds which maintained their
120 See note 121 supra. 	 _
12/3 Section 22(d), which effectively prevents any price compet*on among dealers
selling the shares of a particular fund, was adopted in order to insure the orderly
distribution of fund shares and to prevent discrimination among purchasers of such
shares. Hodes, Current Developments Under Section 22(d) of the Investment Company
Act, 13 B.C. Ind. & Cora. L. Rev. 1061 (1972).
121 15 U.S.C. { 80a-22(b) (1964), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(b) (1) (1970).
192 For a critical appraisal of both the SEC and industry positions, see Mutual Fund
Survey, supra note 121, at 834-38.
133 Id, at 840-42. In support of its argument, the industry relied heavily on a
study report by a consulting firm, Arthur D. Little, Inc. The report indicated that "there
is no way for most investors to participate directly in the ownership of listed securities
and derive value equivalent to that which mutual fund ownership provides except at
higher cost." A.D. Little, Inc„ Economic Studies of the Mutual Fund Industry 1-3 (1967).
See also Comment, Valuation of Mutual Fund Shares for Federal Estate Tax Purposes,
14 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 134, 140 (1972).
184 Report of the Staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission on the Potential
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own sales organizations would then be able to maintain a higher sales
charge for the benefit of their salesmen, but independent dealers would
be forced by price competition to cut sales commissions in order to
reduce prices and, as a result, would lose much of their sales forces.
In 1967, the SEC, acting on the alternative theory that a more competi-
tive price could be established by administrative or legislative pro-
nouncement, chose not to recommend the abolition of section 22 (d),
but suggested instead the establishment of a five percent sales load.'"
This recommendation was incorporated into proposed legislation" ° that
was subsequently altered to provide that the NASD could prohibit its
members from selling securities at a price which included an "exces-
sive" sales load.'"
In 1969, Senator Thomas McIntyre introduced a bill which called
for the complete repeal of section 22 (d)." 8 The Senate Banking and
Currency Committee was hesitant to adopt such a proposal, noting in
a subsequent report that impressive testimony had been presented to
the Committee to the effect that no sufficient study of the consequences
of such an amendment had been made."' The Committee expressed
concern over the effects that such a repeal might have on both the
investing public and the mutual fund industry.'" Indeed, it was per-
haps feared that a complete repeal of section 22(d) would represent
an unwise attempt to protect the interests of investors at the expense
of the industry's distribution system. The Committee recognized "the
value of the services that the investment company industry has pro-
vided and can provide in the future to the many who wish to put their
savings in broadly diversified and professionally managed portfolios.""'
In reporting out S. 2224,142 the bill finally passed by the Senate
in 1969, the Senate Banking and Currency Committee concluded that
partly because of section 22 (d) and partly because of the way in
which mutual fund shares are sold, competition has tended to operate
Economic-Impact of the Repeal of Section 22(d) of the Investment Company Act of
1940, pt. 2, repriiilid in BNA Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. No. 177 (Nov. 15, 1972).
185 Hearings oil H.R. 9510 and H.R. 9511 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and
Finance of the Houe.Z Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
176 (1967) (testimeny of SEC Chairman Hamer Budge).
188 S. 1659, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
187 S. 3724, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948); Mutual Fund Survey, supra note 121,
at 845 n.710.
188 S. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
189 S. Rep. No. 91-184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), reprinted in U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 4897, beginning page 4904 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1969 Senate Report].
140 Id. The Senate Committee asked the SEC to examine the probable consequences
of a complete repeal of 22(d) and to report its findings to the Committee as soon as
practicable. Id.
141 1969 Senate Report, supra note 139, at 4900.
142 S. 2224, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
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in reverse—raising prices rather than lowering them.'" Hence the
approach taken in this bill was to rely not on free competition but on
the existing self-regulatory machinery of the securities industry, as
overseen by the SEC, to protect investors from excessively high sales
loads. S. 2224 amended section 22(d) of the 1940 Act to allow the
NASD to promulgate rules designed to prevent "excessive" sales
charges, such rules being subject to SEC supervision and review under
section 15A(k) (2) of the Securities Exchange Act. 144 The intention
was to protect the interests of both sellers and investors, and the bill
specifically provided that the rules published by the NASD should
allow for "reasonable compensation for underwriters, dealers, and
"salesmen," and for "reasonable sales loads to investors. ' The
version of the bill passed by the House included substantially similar
language."'
The Senate-House Conference Committee on the 1970 Amend-
ments accepted the Senate language relating to the enactment of
NASD rules on sales charges.147 Thus the 1970 Amendments rep-
resented a rejection of both the argument for abolition of section
22(d) and for incorporation of a maximum retail sales price. The
prohibition of the original 1940 Act against "unconscionable or grossly
excessive" sales loads was replaced in the 1970 Amendments by a
simplified prohibition upon "excessive" sales loads as determined
initially by the NASD.'" It is hoped that the result will provide
reasonable compensation for persons involved in the distribution
process, and allow no more than-reasonable sales charges to investors.
Those authorities charged with enforcement of the 1970 standard
do not lack specific legislative history to furnish them with practical
guidance. According to the Senate Report on S. 2224, the "reasonable
compensation" provision was not intended to preserve profits at cur-
rent levels for mutual fund salesmen, but rather to assure that con-
sideration "be given to the nature and quantity of services necessary
to effect the proper distribution of fund shares to the public."'" The
Senate Report also indicates that the requirement of "reasonable sales
loads to investors" anticipates the imposition of higher sales loads in
cases where comparatively greater selling effort or skill is needed.' °
1411 In order to attract competent salesmen, funds had to find a way to increase
the compensation which they could receive. 1969 Senate Report, supra note 139, at 4912.
144 Id. The section of the Securities Exchange Act referred to is found at 15
U.S.C.	 78o(3)(k)(2) (1970).
1" S. 2224, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
146 Conf. Rep. No. 163, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News, 4943, 4944-45 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Conference Report].
147 Id. at 4945.
148 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(b)(1) (1970), amending 15 U.S.C.	 80a-22(h) (1964).
140 1969 Senate Report, supra note 139, at 4912.
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Conversely, it was contemplated that the reasonableness provision
would allow more flexible treatment of sales loads in situations where
comparatively little sales effort is required, as in the automatic re-
investment of dividends."'
Also incorporated into new section 22 are the provisions of the
House bill regarding the authority of the SEC to exercise supervision
over, and to grant qualified exemptions from, the NASD sales load
rules."2
 Qualified exemptions from the NASD rules may be granted
by the SEC to smaller companies which show that they are subject to
comparatively high operating costs and are therefore entitled to charge
a relatively high sales load.'" New section 22 allows the SEC to alter
or supplement the NASD rules in order to effectuate the remedial
purpose of the 1970 Amendments. 154
 The SEC is given the additional
authority to publish its own rules prohibiting the imposition of exces-
sive sales loads by non-NASD members.'" A non-member fund under-
writer may, however, file with the SEC notice of its intention to comply
with the NASD rather than the SEC rules in this area.'"
At present, both the NASD and the SEC are studying the role of
retail price maintenance in the distribution of mutual fund shares. 157
A November 1972 report by the SEC staff, 158
 forwarded by former
Chairman Casey to the House and Senate Committees,'" lends new
support to the movement to repeal section 22(d). The staff concluded
that section 22(d) serves "no compelling public interest" and its
repeal would lower acquisition costs for many mutual fund investors,
150 Id.
151 Id. at 4912-13.
152 Conference Report, supra note 146, at 4945.
158
 IS U.S.C. § 80a-22(b)(1) (1970), amending 15 U.S.C.	 80a-22(b) (1964).
IM 15 U.S.C. H 80a-22(b)(2), (c) (1970), amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-22(b), (c)
(1964).
155
 15 U.S.C. I 80a-22(c) (1970), amending 15 U.S.C. 180a-22(c) (1964).
15e 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(b)(2) (1970), amending 15 U.S.C.	 80a-22(b) (1964).
157 Securities and Exchange Commission Hearings on the Potential Impact of
Repeal of Section 22(d), SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 7534 (Nov. 30,
1972), reprinted in BNA Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. No. 182, at A-16 (Dec. 26, 1972). See also
Proposal to Amend Rule 22d-1 Regarding Quantity Discounts to Certain Bona Fide
Groups, SEC investment Company Act Release No. 7571 (Dec. 21, 1972), reprinted in
CCurrent] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1l 79,148 (1972).
158 Report of the Staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission on the Potential
Impact of a Repeal of Section 22(d) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, pt. I
(1972), reprinted in BNA Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. No. 177 (Nov. 15, 1972). The conclusions
drawn by the report were opposed by the Investment Company Institute in its testimony
before the SEC in February, 1973. The Institute President asserted that repeal of
section 22(d) would severely harm the mutual fund industry by reducing incentives to
sell fund shares and forcing fund salesmen out of business. Wall Street Journal, Feb. 13,
1973, at 7, cols. 1-2.
158 Letter from SEC Chairman William J. Casey to Chairman, Senate Committee
on Banking. Housing and Urban Affairs, BNA Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. No. 177, pt. 2
(Nov. 15, 1972).
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although immediate benefits for investors of one thousand dollars or
less were found to be "highly unlikely." The report indicated that the
impact of the cost savings that would result from section 22(d)'s
repeal would fall almost entirely on independent broker-dealer firms
that sell mutual fund shares, but such repeal would have only a modest
impact on the overall business of most retail sellers of fund shares.
After reviewing this staff report, the SEC determined to hold public
hearings on the desirability of repealing section 22(d) before formu-
lating definitive legislative recommendations. The hearings, which
commenced on February 12, 1973, 100 will also cover the SEC's mutual
fund advertising rules, simplification of mutual fund prospectuses and
the NASD's proposed rules on excessive sales loads, all of which the
Commission felt had a bearing on the distribution of fund shares.
The proposed NASD rules were initially released for public com-
ment on November 8, 1972. The proposed rules set the maximum
sales charge on fund shares at six percent for funds which fail to offer
three specific services—reinvestment of dividends at net asset value,
rights of accumulation and quantity discounts on single purchases. The
sales charge would be permitted to increase, based on the services or
combinations of services a fund offered, up to a maximum of 8y2 per-
cent if all three services are provided. The NASD projected that if
the proposed rules were to become effective, over two-thirds of the ap-
proximately six hundred and fifty U.S.-registered funds charging a
sales load would have to offer additional services or adjust their sales
charges. In addition, the twenty percent of the industry which now
charges a sales load of more than 8y2
 percent would have to reduce
such sales charge.
C. Periodic Payment Plans
The investment company industry has traditionally maintained
that investment in mutual funds offers benefits which the typical in-
vestor of modest means could not otherwise obtain.' 01
 In order to at-
tract a maximum number of persons in this middle-income group, the
funds developed a system of installment investment which allows a
wage-earner to finance his investment out of current income. Under
these periodic payment plans, the investor contracts with a fund to in-
vest fixed amounts at given intervals over a period of years. A con-
tractual plan investor does not purchase mutual fund shares directly,
however. Instead, the investor purchases a security, known as a peri-
odic payment plan certificate, issued by a unit investment trust com-
pany whose assets consist exclusively of shares in the underlying mu-
Ho 2 CCH Mutual Funds Guide, Summary Report No. 105 (Dec. 15, 1972).
161 See Mutual Fund Survey, supra note 121, at 851.
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tual fund.162 The investor acquires only a beneficial interest in the
undivided assets of the periodic plan company which are held in trust
for the planholder by a custodian bank 169 When the investor redeems
his certificates, he has the option of taking their cash value or obtain-
ing the shares in the underlying fund represented by his interest in
the assets of the plan company.' Despite the name "contractual
plan," an investor is never under a binding obligation to continue his
participation in the investment plan. He can present his certificates
for redemption at any time."5
It has been a practice in the industry to deduct the major portion
of the sales load from the payments made in the first years of the plan
—hence their characterization as "front-end load" plans. The heavy,
early application of the sales loads in these plans can work a hardship
on any investor who wishes to discontinue his participation in a
plan."' For example, because a large portion of payments made in the
early years of the plan are allocated to the sales load, an investor who
chooses to redeem his certificates during the early years of the plan can
recover only a small part of his "investment."
Section 27 of the 1940 Act allowed up to fifty percent of the pay-
ments made during the first year to be deducted to cover the cost of the
sales load.'" The rest of the sales charge was then deducted from the
investor's payments over the remaining years of the plan. Unlike the
sales loads on regular purchases of mutual fund shares which were sub-
ject only to an "unconscionable or grossly excessive" test,' the sales
loads on contractual plans were limited by section 27 to nine percent of
the total amount to be invested under the plan. 189 Essentially, the nine
percent maximum represented a .5 percent charge for installment pur-
chasing, since the normal sales load was 8.5 percent of the total invest-
ment.
This restriction, however, provided inadequate protection for in-
vestors wishing to withdraw from a plan before its termination date.
The SEC, believing that many planholders were forced to pay effective
sales loads far above the nine percent maximum because of their early
withdrawal,"° became critical of "front-end loads." For its part, the
102 Id. at 756, 852.
168 Id. at 756.
104 Id. at 757.
106 Id.
100 For a general discussion of the predicament of an investor wishing to cancel,
see id. at 757, 858-60.
107 15 U.S.C. § 80a-27 (1964), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-27 (1970).
168 See text at note 131 supra.
109 15 U.S.C. § 80a-27 (1964), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-27 (1970).
170 Securities and Exchange Commission, Special Study of Securities Markets,
H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., tat Sess., pt. IV, at 191 (1963).
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industry contended that the front-end loads were necessary to provide
adequate and prompt compensation to the salesmen who were essential
to the success of the fund's distribution system."'
In its report accompanying Senate bill S. 2224, which contained
the 1970 Amendments, the Senate Committee recommended two al-
ternatives for limiting the hardships caused by the disproportionate
"front-end" sales loads."' The first alternative would have permitted
the sellers of such plans to continue to charge approximately the same
amount of sales loads over the first four years as they had been able to
collect under the 1940 Act. The significant change, however, was that
instead of collecting the greatest percentage in the first year, the seller
would be required to spread the charges more evenly over the first four-
year period. No more than twenty percent of any one year's payments
could be deducted for sales loads, and the total deduction allowable
during the first four years would be limited to sixty-four percent. It
was expected that this change would correct the pattern established un-
der the 1940 Act whereby the salesmen received most of their com-
missions during the first year of the plan and therefore had little in-
centive to seek to reactivate plans that had become delinquent. 173 By
decreasing the sales charges on payments made in the first year, S. 2224
would have enabled planholders to have a larger portion of their pay-
ments actually invested for their benefit. Also under this alternative,
the sales loads on all payments after the forty-eight monthly payment
would have to be uniform.'" This requirement was designed to dis-
courage overly complex sales loads which would be difficult for an in-
vestor to comprehend.'"
The other alternative considered by the Senate Report continued
the fifty percent maximum first-year 'load allowed under the 1940 Act
but substantially enhanced an investor's refund rights following pay-
ment of a front-end load. If for any reason an investor were to redeem
his underlying shares for cash during the first three years of the plan,
he would be entitled to receive the value of his account as well as a re-
171 Id. at 861-62.
172 Two measures regarding sales loads were introduced in Congress in 1969. One
of these, S. 296, called for a more significant revision than the other: it would have
abolished the front-end load entirely by prohibiting any plan where "the amount of
sales load deducted from any one payment exceeds proportionately the amount deducted
from any other payment .. . ." S. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). The other bill,
S. 34, was more of a compromise measure, allowing 64% of the total sales load to be
deducted in the first four years of the plan, provided however that no more than twenty
percent of any year's payments were deducted for the sales load and that each monthly
payment within any one of the first four years was the same. S. 34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1969).
173 1969 Senate Report, supra note 139, at 4906.
174 Id. at 4913-14.
175 Id.
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fund of any sales charges paid which exceeded fifteen percent of the
total payments made under the plan.'" Within sixty days of the issu-
ance of the plan certificate, the custodian bank would be required to
mail to every planholder a statement of sales charges to be deducted
from future payments and a notification of his refund rights.'" The
planholder would then have sixty days from the date of the mailing of
the notice to cancel his participation in the plan and recover the value
of his account and any sales load already paid.'" Although the House
bill relating to this alternative, H.R. 17333, was similar to the Senate
bill, there were some technical differences which made the House ver-
sion less favorable to investors. If the 1940 Act front-end load allow-
ances were continued, the House bill would have afforded the plan-
holder a refund right only during the first year, as opposed to the first
three years, of the plan.'" Furthermore the planholder would only be
permitted to recover from the underwriter any sales charges paid in
excess of twenty, rather than fifteen, percent of the total payments
made under the plan.18° Finally, the planholder was given only thirty,
rather than sixty, days from the mailing of notification in which to
cancel the plan and recover the same amounts as those allowed under S.
2224.181
As enacted in the 1970 Amendments, new sections 27(d)-(h)
represent a compromise between the two versions. Two alternatives are
offered for determining sales loads for periodic payment plans.'" One
alternative is that which was included in S. 2224, limiting the deduction
for sales loads so as to spread them more evenly over the first four
years.'" The other alternative retains the allowance for a fifty percent
maximum first year load formerly in effect under the 1940 Act, but also
provides for an eighteen-month period after issuance of the certificate
during which a planholder may recover in cash the value of his account
and any sales load paid in excess of fifteen percent of the total pay-
ments made under the plan.'" Under this alternative, a registered in-
vestment company issuing periodic payment plan certificates, or any
depositor of or underwriter for such company, must give written notice
176 Id. at 4914. It was anticipated that the refund privilege would discourage sales
of contractual plans to persons who would probably be unable to fulfill the payment
obligation under the plan. Id. at 4906.
177 Conference Report, supra note 146, at 4945.
178 Id.
170d
8 Id. at 4946.18
181 Id.
182 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-27(d)-(h) (1970), amending 15 U.S.C. § 80a-27 (1964).
183 15	 § 80a-27(h) (1970), amending 15 U.S.C. § 80a-27 (1964).
184 15 U.S.C. § 80a-27(d) (1970).
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to certificate holders of their right to redeem their underlying shares
for cash.'"
III. THE SCOPE OF DISCLOSURE
A. Regulated Activities
1. Registration of Investment Advisers
The 1970 Amendments amended the Investment Advisers Act of
1940 by repealing the exemption from registration provided by section
203 (b) (2) of the Act for advisers whose only clients were investment
companies."' The new amendment requires such advisers to register
under the Advisers Act and makes them subject to the antifraud, book-
keeping, reporting and inspection requirements of the Advisers Act,
as well as to the restriction on fees set forth in amended section 205. 187
The new amendment does not affect the existing exemption from reg-
istration for two types of investment advisers: (1) those whose only
clients are insurance companies, and (2) advisers (other than those
who actually advise investment companies) who do not hold them-
selves out generally to the public as such and who have had less than
fifteen clients during the most recent twelve month period.'" The
amendment increases substantially the number of investment advisers
who are subject to, and required to register under, the Advisers Act.' 89
New proposed rule 202-1 under the Advisers Acti" would imple-
185 As to any investor who has missed three payments or more, such notice must
be given within thirty days following the expiration of fifteen months after the issuance
of the certificate. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-27(e) (1970). If one or more payments have been
missed after the fifteen month period but prior to the expiration of eighteen months
after the issuance of the certificate, such notice is to be given at any time prior to
the expiration of the eighteen-month period. Id. The written notice must inform the
planholder of the value of his account as of the date of the notice and the amount to
which he is entitled upon surrender of his certificate. Id. The custodian bank must
also notify the investor of the sales charges to be deducted from future payments,
and the planholder is given forty-five days from the mailing of this notice to cancel
the plan and recover the specified amounts. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(2) (1970).
180
 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b) (2) (1970), amending 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b) (2) (1964).
1" 15 U.S.C. § 80b-.5 (1970), amending 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5 (1964). See also S. Rep.
No. 91-184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 44-45 (1969), and H.R. Rep. No. 91-1382, 91st Cong., -
2d Sess. 39-40 (1970).
188 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3) (1970).
180 At the time of enactment of the 1970 Amendments, 25 states provided for
registration of investment advisers, 19 of which expressly exempted advisers whose only
clients were investment companies. 1 CCH Mutual Funds Guide Ti 2523 (1971). The
impact, if any, of the new amendment to the exemption provisions of the Advisers Act
upon state policy remains to be assessed at a later time. See also SEC Investment
Company Act Release No. 6336 (Feb. 2, 1971), reprinted in [1970-1971 Transfer Binder]
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. tl 77,951.
100 SEC Investment Advisers Act Release, No. .353 (Dec. 18, 1972), reprinted in
[Current] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 79,146 (1972).
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ment the expanded coverage of the registration requirements of the Act.
Under the proposed rule, which is expected to become effective without
any change in principle, if an adviser is not autonomous under specified
tests, the controlling persons of the adviser, and affiliates of such con-
trolling persons, would be required to register with the SEC as invest-
ment advisers.' Persons or their affiliates who control a registered ad-
viser may be required to register r6gardless of whether such controlling
person derives a profit from the services it povides to the adviser) ."
Exemption from SEC registration would be available only where (1) a
majority of the directors of the registered adviser is independent (as
defined in the rule) of the person controlling the adviser and of any
affiliate of such controlling person; (2) the registered adviser has, in
the opinion of a majority of the independent directors, adequate capi-
tal independent of the controlling person or its affiliates to carry on
its advisory business; (3) the officers, other than administrative offi-
cers, of the registered adviser are independent of the controlling per-
son and any affiliate thereof; (4) the advisory representatives employed
by the registered adviser are independent of the controlling person or
affiliate, and make recommendations independent from such persons,
and (5) research information conveyed to the registered adviser meets
certain specified criteria)" Under, the proposed rule, a wide range of
officers, directors, stockholders holding five percent or more, and con-
trol persons of adviser affiliates would be compelled to register with the
SEC and would become subject to certain record keeping, antifraud
and other provisions of the Advisers Act. The effect on parents of ad-
visers which are organized and operating from a jurisdiction outside
the United States has not been officially determined.
In new section 206(a) of the Advisers Act, 194 the SEC.was given
general power, comparable to that granted by section 6(c) of the In-
vestment Company Act, 195 to exempt individual persons or transactions
from any provision of the Advisers Act or the rules promulgated pur-
suant to it. The SEC's disciplinary powers in section 203 1" over invest-
ment advisers and associated persons of such advisers were expanded
to conform to those powers applicable to broker-dealers and other per-
sons under the 1934 Act)" Similarly, new section 203 (d) of the
191 The definition of control would be that of § 2(a) (9) of the 1940 Act. 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-2 (a) (9) (1970).
192 SEC Investment Advisers Act Release No. 353 (Dec. 18, 1972), reprinted in
[Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 79,146 at 82,483 & n.3 (1972).
198 Id. at 82,483.
194 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(a) (1970), amending 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1964).
195 15 U.S.C. § 80a-6(c) (1970).
190 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(e) (1970), amending 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(d) (1964).
197 15 U.S.C. § 78k (1970).
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Advisers Act provides, as does section 15(b) (4) of the 1934 Act,198
that registration under the Act eliminates the need for use of the
mails or other jurisdictional means to establish a violation of the law."'
In October 1972, SEC Commissioner Hugh Owens indicated pub-
licly that federal regulation of investment advisers must be substan-
tially strengthened, particularly in the fields of registration, financial
responsibility, bonding, and conflict of interest.2°° The recent appoint-
ment of a special SEC Advisory Committee on Investment Companies
and Advisers to recommend reform in this area reflects a trend toward
further federal regulation of investment advisers."' In addition, a num-
ber of recent no-action letters have broadly interpreted the perfor-
mance of certain services to require , registration as an investment ad-
viser.2°2 These interpretations have led to increased enforcement
proceedings for failure to register or to terminate certain services and
practices typically utilized by investment advisers.'"
2. Fund Holding Companies
Another important development in the investment company in-
dustry has been the pyramiding of investment companies through the
use of fund holding companies—companies whose portfolios consist
entirely or largely of securities of other investment companies. Before
1940 there were several closed-end investment companies which in-
vested in other closed-end companies. Section 12(d) (1) of the 1940
Act sought to deal with this situation by prohibiting (subject to certain
108 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4) (1970).
199 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(d) (1970), amending 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3 (1964).
200 BNA Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. No. 173, at A-6 (Oct. 18, 1972). Commissioner Owens
stated that additional disclosures by advisers are needed "to determine whether all
accounts under management are fairly treated by an adviser relative to each other and
compared with the adviser's own account." He then predicted an expanded program of
enforcement inspections. Id.
201 The Advisory Committee has already submitted its first report. SEC Advisory
Committee Recommendations on Reporting Requirements for Investment Companies
and Advisers, [Current] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 79,159 (1972). See also Speech by A.
Mostoff, Dir. of SEC Div. of Inv. Co. Reg., BNA Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. No. 193 (March
14, 1973) at E-1.
202 SEC no-action letters; Frank T. Hines, July 20, 1972, reprinted in 2 CCH
Mutual Funds Guide § 9530 (1972); Hardy & Co., July 6, 1972, id. at if 9526; Fred
Weiler, June 1, 1972, id. at If 9501; William Wood Enterprises, May 31, 1972, id. at
9502; Loran K. Lantz, May 11, 1972, id. at 11 9520; Financial Research Corp., April 5,
1972, id. at ¶ 9468; George L. Bedford, April 5, 1972, id. at § 9519; Schield Stock
Service, Inc., Jan. 26, 1972, id. at 11 9398; and The Media General, July 16, 1971, id. at
11 9529 (1971).
202 On November 5, 1972, the SEC charged the Wall Street Transcript, a weekly
publication, with failure to register under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. The SEC
asserted that most of the publication is "devoted to analyses and reports concerning
securities and advice as to the value of securities and as to the advisability of investing
in, purchasing, and selling securities." BNA Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. No. 176, at A-9 to 10
(Nov. 8, 1972).
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exceptions) a registered investment company from purchasing more
than three percent of the outstanding voting stock of another invest-
ment company unless it already owned twenty-five percent or more of
such stock."' This section, however, was not adequate to cope with all
of the problems which have recently arisen in this area. For example,
according to the SEC's 1966 Public Policy Report, the existence of
fund holding companies resulted in the imposition of additional costs
on investors in the form of greater administrative expenses, sales
charges, and advisory fees 206 The report also noted a danger that the
transactions of the underlying fund would be controlled by the hold-
ing company."'
The 1970 Amendments to section 12(d) (1) of the 1940 Act con-
fronted some of these problems by attempting to regulate the creation,
operation, and growth of fund holding companies. Under the Act as
amended, investment companies may acquire the securities of other in-
vestment companies only within specified limits and subject to detailed
restrictions 2 07 New subparagraph (A) of section 12(d) (1) prohibits
a registered investment company and any company or companies con-
trolled by it from purchasing or otherwise acquiring any security issued
by another investment company if, as a result of such transaction, the
acquiring company or companies controlled by it will own in the ag-
gregate: (1) more than three percent of the total outstanding voting
stock of the acquired investment company; (2) securities issued by the
acquired company having a total value which exceeds five percent of
the total assets of the acquiring investment company; or (3) securities
issued by the acquired company and other investment companies
(other than treasury stock of the acquiring investment company)
whose aggregate value exceeds ten percent of the value of the total as-
sets of the acquiring investment company. 208 For purposes of this sec-
tion, the value of an investment company's total assets is to be com-
puted as of the time of the purchase or acquisition or as close to that .
time as is reasonably possible."' Securities of investment companies
204 15 U.S.C. 80a-12(d) (1) (1964), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 80a-12(d)(1) (1970).
2° 8 Securities and Exchange Commission, Public Policy Implications of Investment
Company Growth, H.R. Rep. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 318 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as SEC 1966 Public Policy Report).
208 Id. at 316.
2" See H.R. Rep. No. 91-1382, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1970), S. Rep. No. 91-184,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 29-31 (1969), and SEC 1966 Public Policy Report, supra note 205,
at 311-24.
208 15 U.S.C. §* 80a-12(d) (1)(A) (i)-(iii) (1970). See also SEC Investment Com-
pany Act Release No. 6440 (April 6, 1971), reprinted in [1970-1971 Transfer Binder]
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 78,022, and SEC Investment Company Act Release*No. 6834
(Nov. 23, 1971), reprinted in [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
11 78,416,
209 15 U.S.C.	 80a-12(d)(1)(G) (1970).
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not registered under the 1940 Act are not excluded in determining
whether the ten percent limitation has been exceeded 2 10
Subparagraph (B) of section 12(d) (1) further restricts the sale
of mutual fund shares to other investment companies. 211 It prohibits
a registered open-end investment fund (the acquired company), its
principal underwriter, or any broker-dealer registered under the Secu-
rities Exchange Act2' 2 from knowingly selling or otherwise disposing
of a security issued by such acquired company to any other investment
company (the acquiring company) or any company controlled by the
acquiring company, if, immediately after such transaction, (1) more
than three percent of the total outstanding voting stock of the regis-
tered mutual fund would be owned by the acquiring company and any
company or companies controlled by it, or (2) more than ten percent
of the total outstanding voting stock of the acquired fund is owned by
the acquiring company, other investment companies, and companies
controlled by them 213 In order to comply with these provisions, it will
be necessary for mutual funds to maintain accurate and up-to-date rec-
ords on all shareholders that are known to be investment companies
and companies controlled by investment companies. As a further
check, such records and relevant information should be made available
to a fund's principal underwriters and to dealers who sell its securities.
Mutual funds and their underwriters and dealers should also adopt
procedures to ascertain the identity of the ultimate purchaser when
any order for an unusually large amount of shares is received.
New subparagraph (C) of section 12(d) (1) imposes limitations
in addition to those contained in subparagraph (A) on purchases by
registered and other investment companies of securities issued by reg-
istered closed-end investment companies. 214
 Since the stock of closed-
end companies is usually bought and sold in secondary trading markets
rather than through the issuance of new shares as in the case of mutual
funds, it would be difficult for a seller to know what portion of a
closed-end company's stock is owned by investment companies. There-
fore subparagraph (C) makes it unlawful for any investment company
and the companies it controls to purchase or otherwise acquire any se-
curity issued by a registered closed-end investment company if, as a re-
sult of the transaction, the acquiring investment company, other invest-
ment companies having the same adviser, and companies controlled
210 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12 (d) (1) (E) (iii) (1970).
211 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(d)(1)(B) (1970).
212 15 U.S.C.	 78(e) (1970).
213 15 U.S.C.	 80a-12(d)(1)(B) (1970).
214 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(d) (1)(C) (1970), amending 15 U.S.C. 80a-12 (d) (1) (1964).
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by such investment companies will own more than ten percent of the
total outstanding voting stock of such closed-end company. 2"
Certain transfers of investment company securities are exempted
from the section 12(d) (1) limitations. Under subparagraph (D), the
above prohibitions do not apply if the acquiring company receives the
securities as a dividend, as the result of an exchange offer approved
under section 11 of the 1940 Act, or as the result of a reorganization
plan other than one devised for the purpose of evading subparagraphs
(A) through (C) of section 12(d)(1). 218 Under subparagraph (E),
the acquisition of investment company securities by a registered unit
investment trust is exempted from the section 12(d) (1) prohibitions
against the transfer of investment company interests to other invest-
ment companies. 217 This exemption thus applies to contractual plan
companies which acquire interests in a specific mutual fund. This sub-
paragraph also exempts securities purchased or acquired by an invest-
ment company if two conditions are met. First, the depositor of, or
principal underwriter for, the acquiring company must be a broker or
dealer registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, or be a
person controlled by such a broker or dealer. Second, the investment
portfolio of the acquiring company must consist solely of the security
which is being acquired. 218
Although new subparagraphs (A), (B) and (C) impose extensive
restrictions on the creation and operation of fund holding companies, 21"
new subparagraph (F) permits the continued creation and operation
of registered fund holding companies subject to certain limitations. 220
These conditions are specified in guidelines promulgated by the SEC's
former Division of Corporate Regulation (now under the administra-
tion of the Division of Investment Management Regulation) : 221 First,
a registered fund holding company may not offer or sell any security
issued by it at a public offering price which includes a sales load of
more than 1.5 percent. Second, a fund holding company, together with
all of its affiliated persons, cannot purchase or acquire in the aggregate
more than three percent of the total outstanding stock of any other in-
vestment company. Under prior law, a holding company could pur-
chase five percent of the total outstanding stock of an investment com-
pany which had a policy of concentration, or three percent of the total
outstanding stock of an investment company which did not have such
215 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(d) (1) (C) (1970).
216 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(d)(1)(D) (1970).
217 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(d)(1)(E) (1970).
218 Id.
219 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(d) (1)(A)-(C) (1970).
220 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(d) (1)(F) (1970).
221 SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 6440 (April 6, 1971), supra note 208.
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a policy. 222 Since a fund holding company's ability to purchase shares
of an investment company is now dependent upon the action of the
broad class of affiliated persons defined in section 2 (a) (3) of the 1940
Act,223
 procedures should be instituted to assure that a fund will be
able to determine, prior to making an investment, the eligibility of the
particular security for the fund holding company's portfolio. Third, no
investment company whose securities are owned by a fund holding
company may be required to redeem more than one percent of its securi-
ties held by such holding company during any period of less than thirty
days. Previously, a fund holding company was entitled to unlimited
redemption within seven days after tender for that purpose, except
during those emergency periods specified in section 22(e) of the 1940
Act.224 The effect of this redemption limitation must be considered
together with the obligation of the fund holding company itself to re-
deem its securities within seven days as specified in section 22 (e).
3. Factoring, Discounting and Real Estate Businesses
Under the original provisions of the 1940 Act, companies pri-
marily engaged in factoring, discounting or financing real estate were
excluded from the definition of "investment company" unless they were
engaged in the business of issuing face-amount certificates of the in-
stallment type or periodic plan certificates 228 The latter category of
company was not excluded in order to combat abuses that had arisen
prior to 1940 in the sales of such securities on an installment basis,
usually to relatively unsophisticated investors of limited means 226 Sec-
tion 3 (c) (5), as altered by the 1970 Amendments, effectively limits the
prior exclusion by including within the definition of an investment com-
pany all those companies which issue securities redeemable at the elec-
tion of the holder.227 The amendment has the effect of extending the
regulatory provisions of the Act to a number of previously uncovered
companies.
4. Oil and Gas Funds
The 1970 Amendments do not alter the present exemption from
registration provided for oil and gas funds under section 3 (c) (9) of
the 1940 Act.228 At the House hearings on the 1970 Amendments, the
oil industry argued that the Investment Company Act recognized that
syndicated drilling by oil fund companies is more like an operating
222 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(d)(1) (1964), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(d)(1) (1970).
223 15 U.S.C,	 80a-2(a)(3) (1970).
224 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(e) (1970).
225 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3 (c) (6) (C) (1964).
226 H.R. Rep. No. 91-1382, 91st Cong., 2d Seas. 17 (1970).
221 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(5) (1970), amending 15 U.S.C. 80a-3(c)(5) (1964).
228 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(C)(9) (1970).
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company directly engaged in the drilling business than a passive in-
vestment company?" To insure direct tax benefits to an investor in
a particular program, his participation is limited to certain activities
and includes no overall interest in the operation of the sponsor com-
pany. Moreover, regulation by the Investment Company Act would
cripple the ability of members of the industry to make immediate de-
cisions free from outside influences."'
During early testimony on section 3 (b) (5) of H.R. 11995 and
S. 2224, SEC Chairman Budge stated that the SEC would not object
to an amendment of that section that would continue the present
exemption for oil and gas investment companies if certain require-
ments were added, the most important of which were (1) participants
must pay $10,000 or more during every consecutive twelve-month
period, (2) participants are not afforded any cash surrender of redemp-
tion rights, and (3) no front-end load or other disproportionate charges
would be made."'
In August 1972, legislation (S. 3884) 2" prepared by the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission to regulate oil and gas drilling funds,
entitled the "Oil and Gas Investment Act of 1972," was introduced in
the Congress at the SEC's request."' The SEC bill would exempt from
registration "oil programs" of companies which directly engage in
actual oil drilling operations, but would extend to registered oil pro-
grams many of the provisions of the 1940 Act concerning self-dealing
transactions. For transactions involving affiliates, which are regulated
under section 17(d) and rule lid-1 of the 1940 Act as discussed above,
the requirement of prior SEC approval would not be imposed. No
hearings were held on the bill, and the measure is expected to receive
new consideration by the Ninety-Third Congress.
B. Specific Disclosure Provisions
1. Changes in Investment Policy
The 1970 Amendments to the Investment Company Act also in-
creased restrictions on management's discretionary power to change
220 Hearings on H.R. 11995, S. 2224, H.R. 13754 and H.R. 14737 Before the Sub-
comm. on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 149-50, 936-50 (1969).
230 Id. See also BNA Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. No. 164, at A-14 to 15 (Aug. 8, 1972).
• 281 Hearings, supra note 229, at 872-74 (testimony of SEC Chairman Hamer Budge).
232 S. 3884, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 4 (1972).
. 233 BNA Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. No. 164, at A-14 (Aug. 8, 1972). This legislation
was introduced pursuant to the decision of the Senate-House Conference Committee on
the 1970 Amendments to strike the provisions of the 1940 Act regulating oil and gas
programs on the understanding that the SEC would submit new legislation on that
subject within eighteen months after passage of the Amendments. Conf. Rep. No. 163,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4943, 4944 (1970).
See also S. 1050, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (Sens. McIntyre and Williams).
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a fund's investment policies. Before 1970, section 8 of the 1940 Act
required funds to reveal in their registration statements policies regard-
ing several specified activities"' as well as policies which the fund
elected to treat as "fundamental.""' Section 13 (a) (3) added strength
to section 8 by providing that any deviation from a stated "funda-
mental" policy would be unlawful unless authorized by a majority of
the fund's shareholders."' The two purposes of these sections were to
provide investors with sufficient basic information to enable them to
select a fund intelligently, and to assure investors that they might
safely rely on the stated policy information furnished, by a particular
und. •
The protection afforded investors by these sections was not wholly
adequate, however. As evidenced by the case of Green v. Brown,281 a
statutory loophole allowed funds to escape section 13 sanctions if the
policy from which they deviated had not been labeled "fundamental"
in the fund's registration statement. In Green, the trial court found
that the fund in question had deviated from an investment policy
which, according to the registration statement, could not be altered
without shareholder approval. The shareholder's complaint was dis-
missed, however, on the ground that the policy in question had not
been labeled "fundamental" in the fund's registration statement and
therefore was not subject to the section 13 (a) prohibitions.'" Although
the holding admittedly seemed illogical and contrary to the purpose
of sections 8 and 13,2" the court concluded that it was the respon-
sibility of the Congress rather than the courts to correct the incon'-
sistency.2"
The 1970 Amendments were intended to eliminate that loophole.
New section 8(b) (2) requires funds to reveal in their registration
statement all investment policies, other than those relating to the
certain activities specified in section 8(b) (1), which are changeable
only with shareholder approval. 241 In addition, new section 8(b) (3)
imposes a similar disclosure requirement for policies which the fund
deems fundamental."' The sanctions for violation of the disclosure
requirement were also expanded by the 1970 Amendments. Under
new section 13(a) (3), shareholder approval is now required for any
234 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8(b) (1) (1964), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8(b)(2) (1970).
236 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8(b)(2) (1964), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8(b) (3) (1970).
236 15 U.S.C. § 80a-13(a)(3) (1964), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-13(a)(3) (1970).
237 276 F. Supp. 753 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
288 Id. at 756.
239 Id.
240 For a more extensive discussion of the subsequent history and significance of
Green, see Comment, 13 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 1113, 1123-24 & n.68 (1972).
241 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8(b)(2) (1970), amending 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8(b) (1) (1964).
242 15 U.S.C. 80a-8(b)(3) (1970), amending 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8(b)(2) (1964).
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changes in investment policies which are described in the registration
statement as changeable only after shareholder approval or which are
labeled as "fundamental" policies."'
Ostensibly these new provisions would allow an investor to rely
safely on the information disclosed in a fund's registration statement.
It has been suggested, however, that under new sections 8 and 13
funds may, through careful drafting of their registration statements,
present certain policies designed to attract investors and yet retain
sufficient flexibility to engage in a wide variety of investment practices
without subjecting themselves to liability for deviating from stated
policies?" If in the registration statement a policy is not labeled
"fundamental" or is not described as being changeable only upon
shareholder approval, the fund is free to deviate from that policy at
will. In short, the provisions regarding disclosure of investment
policies, even as amended, may still provide problems for the un-
sophisticated investor.
2. UndisclOsed Capital Gains Payments
Prior to the Investment Company Act of 1940, the payment of
dividends out of undifferentiated corporate income was a common
practice in the mutual fund industry."' This lack of disclosure con-
fused many fund shareholders who were unable to distinguish distri-
butions of capital gains from dividends paid out of a fund's current
investment income. This confusion was seriously detrimental to share-
holders for several reasons. First, for income tax purposes, a capital
gain dividend from an investment company is treated as a capital gain
to the shareholder.24° If an investor failed to recognize a capital gains
dividend as such, he would lose the tax advantage of the preferential
rates applied to capital gains. Second, the undisclosed distribution of
capital gains was often connected with certain selling practices. 247
Sometimes the price paid for a security by an investor included an
amount which would later be paid out to the investor as a dividend.
Because a sales .charge was paid on the total price of the security, it
was argued by some that the shareholder was in effect paying a sales
commission on his own dividend. 48 Third, in the minds of some share-
holders, much of the measure of a fund's success is reflected in its
current investment income. The inability of an investor to differentiate
248 15 U.S.C. § 80a-13(a)(3) (1970), amending 15 U.S.C. 80a-13(a)(3) (1964).
244 Comment, supra note 240, at 1124-25.
248 Comment, The Mutual Fund Industry: A Legal Survey, 44 Notre Dame Lawyer
732, 792 (1969) Chereinafter cited as Mutual Fund Survey].
243 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 852(b)(3)(B).
247 Mutual Fund Survey, supra note 245, at 792-93.
245 Id. at 792.
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between capital gains dividends and regular investment income divi-
dends prevented him from making a thorough appraisal of the fund's
current performance.
Section 19 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 249 was de-
signed to provide investors with adequate identification of capital
gains dividends. That section made it unlawful for a fund to pay
dividends out of capital unless the distribution was accompanied by a
written statement adequately disclosing to the shareholder the source
or sources of the payment."° This provision was not sufficient to dispel
shareholder questions, however. The 1940 Act did not limit the fre-
quency of capital gains distributions, and consequently a fund was
able to make such payments whenever it chose. Adoption by a fund
of an erratic distribution pattern inevitably resulted in shareholder
confusion. Indeed, it was recognized in the Investment Company In-
stitute's "Guide to Business Standards" that a distribution of capital
gains at any time other than at the end of a fiscal year or shortly
thereafter could cause investors to believe that the capital gains dis-
tributions were part of the fund's regular dividends paid out of invest-
ment income."'
New section 19 is intended to eliminate investor misunderstand-
ing regarding capital gains distributions. The disclosure requirements
of the 1940 Act were retained and are now incorporated in section
19(a),252 Section 19(b), which was created by the 1970 Amendments,
limits the frequency with which a fund may distribute its realized
long-term capital gains. A fund may now make such a distribution
only once every twelve months, except as the SEC may permit for the
protection of investors and the public 2 62 Such a limitation on distribu-
tions should relieve fund managers of the pressure to realize capital
gains on a frequent and regular basis and would mitigate the improper
sales practices related to the distribution of capital gains . 2" The fre-
quency limitation should also reduce the administrative expenses in-
volved with quarterly or semi-annual capital gains distributions. 255
New rule 19b-12" limits a "regulated" investment company, as
249 15 U.S.C. § 80a-19 (1964), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 80a-I9 (1970).
260 15 U.S.C. § 80a-19 (1964), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-I9 (1970).
251 S. Rep. No. 91-184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), reprinted in U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 4897, 4924 (1970).
255 13
	
§ 80a-19(a) (1970), amending 15 U.S.C. § 80a-19 (1964).
252 15 U.S.C. § 80a-19(b) (1970).
254 SEC 1966 Public Policy Report, supra note 205, at 194-95.
255 Id.
256 SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 6834 (Nov. 23, 1971), reprinted in
[1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 9 78,416. The new rule is declared
effective with respect to distribution made in taxable years beginning on or after January
1, 1972, other than distributions made pursuant to section 855 of the Code, of gains
realized prior to that date. Id.
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defined in the Internal Revenue Code,' to a single distribution of
long-term capital gains realized by the fund during any one taxable
year, except for a supplemental distribution under section 855 of the
Code258
 which does not exceed ten percent of the fund's prior capital
gains distribution. The one exception in the rule to the single-distribu-
tion requirement permits a regulated investment company to take
advantage of the - "spillover" provisions of the Code under which
certain distributions made after the close of a taxable year are con-
sidered as made during that year. This enables investment companies
to distribute such realized gains without making them taxable to the
fund.
Rule 19b-1 limits a registered investment company which is not
a "regulated investment company" to one distribution of long-term
capital gains in any one taxable year. It also includes a. clarifying
provision which permits a unit investment trust to distribute capital
gains dividends received from a "regulated investment company" with-
in a reasonable time after receipt. 2"
The new rule allows a registered investment company, when
faced with unforeseen circumstances, to request timely authorization
to make a distribution 'which would not otherwise be permitted under
the rule.2e0 The SEC indicated that relief would be granted to a
"regulated•investment company" under this provision only where the
initial distribution was made late in the taxable year and the likelihood
of a "spillover" distribution exceeding ten percent of the initial dis-
tribution could not reasonably have been foreseen, and noted that
under the Code a "regulated investment company" may avoid a
"spillover" distribution by making a single distribution with respect
to a taxable year after the close of such year."'
3. Reporting Civil Litigation to the SEC
In order to provide the SEC with more information concerning
litigation in which funds or their affiliates are involved, section 33 of
the original 1940 Act imposed certain disclosure responsibilities on a
fund or any of its affiliated persons who were defendants in a deriva-
tive suit involving "an alleged breach of official duty." 202
 The section
also required a fund and its affiliated persons who were involved in
such a suit to file with the SEC copies of the pleadings and the court
257 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 851(b) (4)(A) (ii).
259 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 855.
259 SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 6834 (Nov. 23, 1971), supra note
256.
200 Id.
-261
 Id.
292 15 U.S.C. § 80a-32 (1964), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-32 (1970).
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record after a final judgment on the merits had issued or after a
settlement or compromise had been approved by a court of competent
jurisdiction. 2"
These disclosure requirements in section 33, however, provided the
SEC with only limited information regarding litigation involving
mutual funds. A change was needed which "would permit the Com-
mission to be kept informed of the progress of the litigation from its
outset in the trial court, and would make it possible for the Commis-
sion to promptly take such action as may be appropriate."2" In
response to this need for greater disclosure, the 1970 Amendments
expanded the filing requirements of section 33 to apply to copies of
all pleadings, verdicts, or judgments filed with the court or served on
a party as well as copies of any proposed settlement, compromise, or
discontinuance in a derivative suit by a fund shareholder against an
officer, director, adviser, trustee or depositor of a fund. 205
 Also under
new section 33, copies of motions, transcripts or other documents filed
in, or issued by, the court or served on a party must be filed if re-
quested by the SEC. 28" Any document delivered to the fund or to a
party defendant must be transmitted to the SEC within ten days after
receipt of the document?" Any document filed in court or delivered
by the fund or party defendant must be filed within five days after the
filing or delivery. 208
A document need not be filed by any person if the same docu-
ment has already been filed by another person 2 09
 In cases involving
multiple defendants, in order to avoid duplicate filings, it is expected
that the defendants will agree to designate one among them to file the
necessary documents.
CONCLUSION
The new law implements a large number of changes in the prior
law which are of importance to the practical operation of the mutual
fund industry, and expands significantly the regulatory role of the
SEC and the NASD. Expanded, as well, is the scope of judicial review
over internal investment company operations, including regulation and
review of investment adviser compensation, sales loads, structure of
contractual plans, composition of fund boards, procedures for approval
263 Id.
204 S. Rep. No. 91-184, supra note 251, at 4937 (1970).
200
268
287
288
15 U.S.C. § 80a-32 (1970), amending 15 U.S.C.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-32 (1970).
15 U.S.C. § 80a-32(A) (1970).
15 U.S.C. § 80a-32(B)	 (1970).
80a-32 (1964).
262 SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 6506 (May 5, 1971), reprinted in
[1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 78,048.
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of investment advisory and underwriting contracts, conduct of affiliated
or "interested persons," selection of fund accountants, duties of fund
directors, distribution of long-term capital gains, insider trading re-
strictions, retroactive registration of fund shares, and operation of
fund holding companies. The registration and disciplinary powers of
the SEC under the 1910 Act and the Investment Advisers Act have
also been expanded. Philosophically, the new Act is disposed toward
limiting the benefits obtainable from fund operations by managers
and affiliated persons, reducing management compensation to "rea-
sonable" levels, strengthening the watchdog role of fund disinterested
directors, and providing more meaningful and precise standards with
respect to disclosure of fund operations. Fund operations will not
necessarily be made easier for management but, it is hoped, day-to-day
operations will not prove to be so heavily regulated that the allocation
of management energies to effecting proper investment performance
on behalf of stockholders will be unnecessarily diluted. Additional time
for observation of investment company operations under the 1970
Amendments, as implemented by the currently increasing number of
SEC releases and staff interpretative and no-action letters, is necessary
to determine whether the Amendments represent a meaningful and
creative regulatory statute, justifying the twelve years of exhaustive
study, congressional consideration, and SEC interpretation from which
the Investment Company Amendments Act emerged.
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